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HART ON SOCIAL RULES AND THE 
FOUNDATIONS OF LAW:  LIBERATING THE 
INTERNAL POINT OF VIEW 
Stephen Perry* 
INTRODUCTION 
The internal point of view is a crucial element in H.L.A. Hart’s theory of 
law.  Hart first introduces the notion by pointing out that, within a social 
group which has rules of conduct, “it is possible to be concerned with the 
rules, either merely as an observer who does not himself accept them, or as 
a member of the group which accepts and uses them as guides to conduct.”1  
Those who are concerned with the rules in the latter way have, Hart tells us, 
adopted the internal point of view towards the rules.  Hart thus defines the 
internal point of view in a very specific manner, by reference to the notion 
of “accepting and using a rule.” Furthermore, as Hart’s more general 
discussion in The Concept of Law makes clear, he has in mind quite specific 
and closely related conceptions both of what a rule is and of what it means 
to accept and use a rule.   
A rule is, according to Hart, a certain kind of complex social practice that 
consists of a general and regular pattern of behavior among some group of 
persons, together with a widely shared attitude within the group that this 
pattern is a common standard of conduct to which all members of the group 
are required to conform.  To use the rule is to conform one’s own conduct 
to the relevant pattern, and to accept the rule is to adopt the attitude that the 
pattern is a required standard both for oneself and for everyone else in the 
group.  The existence of such “social” rules, as Hart calls them, thus 
consists of these very facts of acceptance and use.  Since the internal point 
of view is just the perspective of those who accept the rule, it follows that, 
as a conceptual matter, a social rule does not even exist unless a sufficiently 
large number of people within the requisite group adopt the internal point of 
view with respect to some regular pattern of behavior. 
 
* John J. O’Brien Professor of Law and Professor of Philosophy, University of Pennsylvania 
Law School.  I received very helpful comments on earlier drafts of this essay from Joseph 
Raz and Scott Shapiro; participants at the Conference The Internal Point of View in Law and 
Ethics, held at the Fordham University School of Law; participants at a Legal Theory 
Workshop held at the Faculty of Law, McGill University; and participants in an ad hoc 
faculty workshop held at the University of Pennsylvania Law School. 
 1. H.L.A. Hart, The Concept of Law 89 (2d ed. 1994). 
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A social rule in Hart’s sense lies, according to Hart, at the foundation of 
every legal system.  The rule of recognition, as he calls this fundamental 
rule, is a complex social practice of the kind just described which holds 
among those persons in a society whom we would intuitively recognize as 
its officials.  The normative character of the rule of recognition, like all 
Hartian social rules, is duty- or obligation-imposing.  More particularly, it 
imposes a duty on officials to apply other rules which can, in accordance 
with criteria set out by the rule of recognition, be identified as valid law.  
The existence of a rule of recognition is, according to Hart, a necessary 
condition of the existence of a legal system.  Since the rule of recognition, 
like other social rules, cannot exist unless a sufficiently large number of 
people in the requisite group adopt the internal point of view, and since, for 
Hart, the requisite group is a society’s officials, it follows that a legal 
system cannot exist unless most—if not all—of its officials adopt the 
internal point of view.  By the same token, a legal system can, according to 
Hart, exist even if no one other than its officials adopts the internal point of 
view.   
The internal point of view serves two particularly important and related 
roles in Hart’s theory of law.  The first is, as just discussed, to specify one 
of the constitutive elements of the complex social practice that comprises a 
legal system, and, more particularly, to specify that element which permits 
us to say that law is not just a social practice, but a normative social 
practice.  The second role is to explain the normative dimension of the 
meaning of such statements as “It is the law of Pennsylvania that everyone 
has an obligation to do X.”2  John Austin and Jeremy Bentham had 
maintained that law could be explained as a general habit of obedience, and 
that the concept of obligation could be reduced to the nonnormative 
concepts of threat and sanction.  Hart argues very persuasively, and to the 
satisfaction of virtually all of his successors in jurisprudence, that neither of 
these reductive analyses has any hope of success, precisely because they 
omit the normative dimension of, respectively, the practice of law and the 
concept of obligation.  In each case, the remedy that Hart proposes to cure 
the defect is the internal point of view.  Habits and rules both involve 
regular patterns of behavior, but rules also involve, and are partly 
constituted by, a characteristic normative attitude:  Those who accept the 
rule regard the pattern of behavior as a common and binding standard of 
conduct.  The internal point of view also figures in Hart’s analysis of the 
meaning of legal statements.  Although the point has not been widely 
appreciated until recently, the account Hart offers of the meaning of such 
statements as “It is the law of Pennsylvania that everyone has an obligation 
to do X” is in part a non-cognitivist one.  The normative aspect of the 
 
 2. Scott Shapiro suggests that the internal point of view serves four distinct roles in 
Hart’s theory of law, of which these are but two.  The others are to specify a particular kind 
of motivation that the law can provide and to offer an account of the intelligibility of legal 
practice. Scott J. Shapiro, What Is the Internal Point of View?, 75 Fordham L. Rev. 1157 
(2006). 
  
2006] LIBERATING THE INTERNAL POINT OF VIEW 1173 
meaning of this statement has, on Hart’s view, nothing to do with whether 
or not the residents of Pennsylvania do, in fact, have an obligation to do X, 
but consists, rather, in the expressed endorsement of the view that everyone 
in Pennsylvania is obligated to do X.3  The meaning of the normative 
dimension of such statements is given, in other words, by the fact that those 
who assert this statement express their acceptance of the internal point of 
view towards the law of Pennsylvania.   
Although Hart rejects Austin’s reductive analyses of law and obligation, 
he shares the naturalistic and empiricist commitments that led Austin to be 
suspicious of normativity.  In this essay I argue that Hart’s own theory of 
law does not fully escape the difficulties of the Austinian theory that he so 
successfully criticizes because in the end, he, like Austin, does not take 
normativity sufficiently seriously.  Since the internal point of view is 
nothing more than an attitude that a standard is binding, Hart is not offering 
an account of the normativity of law that looks to its (potential) reason-
givingness.  I argue that Hart’s non-cognitivist account of the meaning of 
legal statements, based as it is on the idea that the proper explanation of the 
normativity of law looks to the expressed endorsement of a standard of 
conduct rather than to the law’s potential to create reasons for action of a 
specifically legal kind, prevents him from offering an analysis of power-
conferring rules that fully corresponds to his analysis of duty-imposing 
rules.  The upshot is that Hart cannot offer a proper theoretical account of 
that aspect of the phenomenon of law which he himself took to be most 
important, namely, the claim by legal officials to have the authority or 
power to change the normative situation of those who are subject to law.  
That law makes this claim is indeed one of the most fundamental attributes 
of both the concept and practice of law.  The internal point of view, 
properly understood, is the perspective both of the authorities who make 
this claim and of the subjects of law who accept it.  To accept the 
legitimacy of the law’s claim to authority is to believe that the law has such 
authority, and not simply to adopt an attitude of endorsement towards the 
law’s requirements.  The internal point of view must be freed, in other 
words, both from its conceptual role as a constitutive element of a certain 
kind of norm and from its semantic role in a non-cognitivist account of the 
meaning of legal statements.  Once we adopt a properly liberated, 
cognitivist understanding of the internal point of view, then we are no 
longer committed, as Hart was, to conceiving of law as a socially practiced 
norm of a certain kind, a constitutive element of which is a widely shared 
attitude of endorsement.  While it might be the case that accepting the 
authority of law involves the acceptance of a norm—presumably, a power-
conferring rather than a duty-imposing norm—it is by no means obvious 
 
 3. To the best of my knowledge, the non-cognitivist aspect of Hart’s understanding of 
the meaning of normative statements was first noticed by Raz. See Joseph Raz, H.L.A. Hart 
(1907-1992), 5 Utilitas 145, 147-49 (1993) [hereinafter Raz, H.L.A. Hart (1907-1992)]; 
Joseph Raz, The Purity of the Pure Theory, 138 Revue Internationale de Philosophie 441, 
447-48, 454 (1981) [hereinafter Raz, The Purity of the Pure Theory]. 
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that this is so, and to show that it is so requires more in the way of argument 
than Hart provides.  Adopting a cognitivist understanding of the internal 
point of view, and of the meaning of normative statements generally, also 
leads naturally to the recognition that the meaning of normative expressions 
is, contrary to Hart’s own view of the matter, the same in both moral and 
legal contexts.  Legal normativity is moral normativity, and the law’s claim 
to authority is a moral claim. 
I.  NORMS 
It will be helpful to begin our discussion of the internal point of view 
with the general notion of a norm.  I will stipulatively define a norm as a 
standard of conduct or purported standard of conduct that (1) is of a type 
which has existence conditions that refer in some fairly direct way to facts 
about human behavior, attitudes, or beliefs, or to some combination of such 
facts, and that (2) does in fact exist because the appropriate existence 
conditions have been met.  The intuitive idea is that a norm is a standard of 
conduct or purported standard of conduct which is also a social artifact of a 
certain kind, because its existence consists of, or at least depends directly 
on, certain forms of human behavior.  A norm can thus only exist if it is 
practiced, accepted, believed in, endorsed, prescribed, recognized, or 
otherwise “engaged with,” to use a useful term of John Gardner’s, by 
human beings.4 
For present purposes, I will label the existence conditions which a norm 
must meet as “social” conditions.  A better general term might be 
“behavioral,” since there can be individual as well as group norms.  But in 
the context of law it is safe to assume that the existence conditions of any 
norm will always refer to the behavior, attitudes, or beliefs of groups of 
persons, even if they also sometimes refer to the behavior and attitudes of 
individuals (such as the absolute monarch Rex, who figures in a well-
known example discussed by Hart).  Hartian social rules are clearly norms, 
but the notion has been defined sufficiently broadly so as to encompass 
most other positivist accounts of the foundations of a legal system which 
can be described in a very broad sense as conventionalist.5  These include 
Jules Coleman’s and Gerald Postema’s early idea that the rule of 
recognition is a coordination convention in the narrow sense defined by 
David Lewis,6 and Scott Shapiro’s more recent suggestion that the 
 
 4. John Gardner, Legal Positivism:  5 ½ Myths, 46 Am. J. Juris. 199, 200 (2001). 
 5. See the helpful general discussions of conventionalism in law in Jules L. Coleman, 
The Practice of Principle 74-102 (2001); Leslie Green, The Authority of the State 89-121 
(1988); John Finnis, Natural Law and Natural Rights 134-60 (1980); Andrei Marmor, Legal 
Conventionalism, in Hart’s Postscript:  Essays on the Postscript to The Concept of Law 193 
(Jules L. Coleman ed., 2001). 
 6.  Jules L. Coleman, Negative and Positive Positivism, 11 J. Legal Stud. 139 (1982); 
Gerald Postema, Coordination and Convention at the Foundations of Law, 11 J. Legal Stud. 
165 (1982).  On Lewis–style conventions, see David K. Lewis, Convention:  A Philosophical 
Study (1969). 
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fundamental social practice underlying law is an instance of Michael 
Bratman’s notion of Shared Cooperative Activity.7  It is important to notice, 
however, that most of these “conventionalist” accounts of law’s foundations 
are meant to show how appropriately characterized conventionalist norms 
can, under certain conditions, be reason-giving or even obligation-
imposing.  As was noted in the Introduction, Hart’s account of social rules 
does not appear to have any such aim, since his understanding of the 
normativity of law looks to the expressed endorsement of a standard of 
conduct as guiding or binding, rather than to an explanation of how 
standards of conduct actually are or might be binding for some person or 
group of persons. 
The claim that the content of law can be completely captured by a set of 
norms is characteristic of many modern versions of legal positivism, and 
the question of how properly to formulate the existence conditions of legal 
norms is a subject of lively and ongoing debate among positivists.  This 
debate builds upon, and is not easily separated from, the more general 
debate about the nature of norms that takes place within the philosophy of 
practical reason.  But not all contemporary legal philosophers accept the 
claim that the normative content of law can be completely captured by a set 
of norms, in the sense of “norm” that I have defined.  In order to avoid a 
possible source of confusion here, it is worth drawing explicit attention to 
the fact that the meaning of the term “normative” differs in an important 
way from the meaning of the term “norm,” even though the two are 
obviously closely related.  The term “normative” refers in a general and 
rather diffuse way to the full range of reasons for action that people can 
have, and thus includes within its scope moral and prudential reasons as 
well as reasons that derive from norms as I defined them earlier.8  A norm, 
however, has social or behavioral existence conditions.  A norm cannot 
exist unless somebody thinks that it has some effect on someone’s reasons 
for action, although by the same token it can exist even if it does not, in 
fact, affect anyone’s reason for action at all.  This is because a norm is 
simply a certain kind of artifact, the existence of which depends on certain 
facts about human behavior, attitudes, or beliefs.  The fact that such norms 
 
 7. Scott J. Shapiro, Law, Plans, and Practical Reason, 8 Legal Theory 387 (2002); 
Scott J. Shapiro, Legal Activity as Massively Shared Agency (unpublished manuscript, on 
file with the author); see also Coleman, supra note 5, at 95-102.  On Bratman’s notion of 
Shared Cooperative Activity, see, e.g., Michael E. Bratman, Shared Cooperative Activity, 
101 Phil. Rev. 327 (1992). 
 8. The sense of the term “normative” discussed in the text refers to the general notion 
of reason-givingness and is therefore applicable to all reasons for action, whether they derive 
from norms or not.  But there is also another, overlapping sense of the term, which is 
concerned with the nature of norms as such.  In this second sense, the term does not 
necessarily involve the idea of reason-givingness, since the point of some norms is not to 
guide conduct but rather to provide standards of evaluation.  The norms of theory evaluation 
in science are of this kind, for example.  I thank Scott Shapiro for reminding me of this 
point. 
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are regarded as reason-affecting does not mean that they are, in fact, reason-
affecting. 
It is also worth pointing out that while people sometimes refer in a rather 
loose way to moral norms, morality cannot, in general, be regarded as 
consisting of norms in the sense defined earlier, unless one accepts a rather 
implausible understanding of the nature of morality.9  Obviously, morality 
has normative content, in the sense that there are distinctive moral reasons 
for action that take the form of obligations, rights, permissions, etc.  As a 
general matter, however, these reasons for action do not have behavioral 
existence conditions in the way that norms do.  For example, all of us are 
under the moral obligation not to enslave other human beings, but we do 
not have this obligation, or at least we do not exclusively have it, by virtue 
of a Hartian social rule or by virtue of any other kind of norm.  The 
obligation exists even in societies which have institutionalized forms of 
slavery and in which people do not regard slavery as involving a wrong.  
People in such societies thus have a moral obligation that they not only 
regularly violate, but that they do not even know they have. 
Finally, to avoid one other possible source of confusion, the term “norm” 
as I am employing it here can encompass both rules in the peremptory or 
mandatory sense that Joseph Raz has captured quite precisely in his notion 
of an exclusionary reason,10 and also principles in the sense of standards 
that, as Ronald Dworkin described them in an early article, have a 
dimension of weight but are nonetheless not dispositive of what should be 
done on a particular occasion.11  If this is what is meant by a principle, then 
some principles are norms, but some are not.  In exactly the same way, 
some exclusionary reasons are norms, but some are not.  To be a norm, the 
standard in question must both have and meet social existence conditions.  
If it does not, then it is not a norm. 
Hart ordinarily used the term “rule” rather than the term “norm.”  A rule, 
as I shall use the term, is a norm which is general at least in the sense that it 
has application to more than one case, and which is also usually general in 
the sense of applying to more than one person.  A policeman’s order which 
is issued on a particular occasion to a particular motorist to pull over to the 
side of the road is a norm, but it is not a rule.  Since the distinction between 
norms and rules is not one that has any particular significance in the 
theoretical debates that I will be discussing in this essay, I will use the terms 
“rule” and “norm” more or less interchangeably. 
It is not, I think, in any way controversial to state that much of the 
content of what I will call “regular” law, meaning law that has more or less 
direct application to persons and which can be roughly characterized as 
non-foundational in nature, consists of norms.  The laws passed by a 
legislature are norms, for example, as are the standards of conduct that 
 
 9. Cf. Joseph Raz, Incorporation by Law, 10 Legal Theory 1, 3 (2004). 
 10. See, e.g., Joseph Raz, Practical Reason and Norms 35-48 (1975). 
 11. Ronald Dworkin, Taking Rights Seriously 22-28 (1978). 
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emerge from the application of the doctrine of precedent.  It is controversial 
whether the entire content of regular law consists of norms—for example, 
part of its content might be drawn directly from morality—and it is also 
controversial whether at least some legal norms might have moral as well as 
social existence conditions.  These are not, however, controversies that bear 
on the questions I will be discussing in this essay, and for present purposes 
we can set them aside.  My interest, rather, is with the theoretical nature of 
the foundational arrangements of law. 
II. SOCIAL RULES AND THE INTERNAL POINT OF VIEW 
Hart first introduces his particular conception of a social rule, and with it 
the idea of the internal point of view, in the course of discussing his now-
famous example of the absolute monarch Rex.  Rex, Hart tells us, “controls 
his people by general orders backed by threats requiring them to do various 
things which they would not otherwise do, and to abstain from doing things 
which they would otherwise do.”12  Each member of the general population 
has a habit of obeying Rex’s orders, and since everyone obeys him we can 
speak of a convergent habit.  So far, however, contrary to the views of 
Austin and Bentham, we do not have a situation that can properly be 
characterized as law, even though the situation has, in Hart’s words, “some 
of the important marks of a society governed by law,” including a certain 
unity which might even entitle us to call it a state.13  But we nonetheless do 
not yet have law because there is nothing in the situation as thus far 
described which would entitle us to say that Rex has the right to rule, and 
thus a fortiori there is nothing which would permit us to say that Rex’s right 
to rule is immediately passed to a successor, for example his son, when Rex 
dies.  Hart argues very persuasively that the idea of habitual obedience 
cannot, by itself, “account for the continuity to be observed in every normal 
legal system, when one legislator succeeds another.”14  If we are to be able 
to speak of a right to succeed, Hart says, 
there must, during the reign of the earlier legislator, have been somewhere 
in the society a general social practice more complex than any that can be 
described in terms of habit of obedience:  there must have been the 
acceptance of the rule under which the new legislator is entitled to 
succeed.15 
In other words, once we can describe the situation by reference to a certain 
kind of rule, then certain new concepts come into play, such as “title,” 
“right to succeed,” and, most importantly, “right to make law,” which 
 
 12. Hart, supra note 1, at 52. 
 13. Id. at 53. 
 14. Id. at 54. 
 15. Id. at 55. 
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entitle us to describe the situation as involving at least a rudimentary legal 
system.16 
Hart’s critique of Austin shows beyond a shadow of a doubt that law 
cannot be reduced to the simple elements of habit and obedience.  But 
Hart’s own theory of law brings with it certain difficulties of its own, and I 
shall argue that these difficulties flow, in part, from Hart’s inability to make 
a completely clean break with the Austinian approach.  As a preliminary 
matter, let me first draw attention to two aspects of the Rex example which 
seem to require a fuller explanatory account than can be found in Hart’s 
initial discussion of the example.  The first is that Hart moves immediately 
from the impossibility of accounting for law by reference solely to the 
elements of habit and obedience to the conclusion that this deficiency can 
only be remedied by bringing in the concept of a rule, where by a “rule” he 
means, as his subsequent discussion in The Concept of Law soon makes 
clear, a very particular kind of norm, as that term was defined in the 
preceding section.  The second point is that, in the Rex example, the kind of 
rule that would seem to be required to make sense of the notion of a right to 
rule, if indeed we need the notion of a rule here at all, would most naturally 
be thought to be a power-conferring rule.  The appropriate rule, in other 
words, would appear to be one that confers on Rex a power which Rex can 
exercise so as to change the normative situation of others, and, in particular, 
to subject them to obligations.  This is surely the most straightforward way 
to make sense of the point, heavily emphasized by Hart, that Rex has a right 
to rule.  In fact, however, the kind of rule that Hart goes on to describe, and 
that he says we require in order to have sufficiently adequate conceptual 
resources to capture the phenomenon of law in its full social complexity, is 
not a power-conferring rule at all, but rather a duty-imposing rule.  This 
creates something of a puzzle, to which I shall return later.  First, however, 
let me summarize the concept of a social rule as Hart describes it. 
Hart’s analysis of a social rule is meant to make more precise the familiar 
idea of a rule or norm which is based on custom.  According to Hart’s 
analysis, a social rule exists for a group of persons when a certain pattern of 
behavior within the group is general, deviations from the pattern give rise to 
criticism, criticism of such deviations is regarded as justified, and, finally, 
 
 16. It is perhaps worth pointing out a certain oddity about the Rex example.  A rule of 
recognition is supposed to be a social rule that holds among officials and officials only, but 
since in the example there is only one official, namely Rex, that could not be true here.  
Rex’s right to rule clearly does not derive from a personal rule which he has unilaterally 
adopted, or which in some other way derives from his attitudes and behavior alone.  It is 
clear from Hart’s description of the example that the behavior and attitudes of members of 
the general population, and not just the behavior and attitudes of Rex, count among the 
existence conditions of the rule which confers on Rex the right to rule.  In Part III, infra, I 
discuss the question of why Hart might have been led to make the somewhat implausible 
claims that (1) it is only the behavior and attitudes of officials that are to be taken into 
consideration in determining whether or not a rule of recognition exists, and (2) that a legal 
system can exist even if no one in the relevant society besides officials adopts the internal 
point of view. Id. at 116-17.  
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there is associated with the pattern a so-called “internal aspect.”17  The 
internal aspect involves a “reflective critical attitude” toward the relevant 
pattern of behavior, which means that it is regarded by members of the 
group as a common standard of conduct to which they all have reason to 
conform.  The fact that the pattern of behavior is regarded as a standard is 
also taken to legitimize criticism of deviations from the pattern and to 
justify the use of a wide range of normative language:  You ought (or ought 
not) to do such and such a thing; doing such and such is wrong.  As this 
general characterization of social rules makes clear, a social rule is a kind of 
norm in the sense of that term that was defined in Part I, and the various 
elements of a social rule that Hart describes—a general pattern of behavior, 
an internal aspect in the form of a reflective critical attitude, and so on—
establish the existence conditions for this particular class of norm.  Hart 
goes on to say that in the case of a rule for which “the general demand for 
conformity is insistent and the social pressure brought to bear upon those 
who deviate or threaten to deviate is great,” the rule is regarded as giving 
rise to an obligation.18  The internal point of view is the point of view of 
those in the group, consisting of at least a majority, who accept that the rule 
is binding upon all members of the group in the manner suggested by the 
rule’s internal aspect.19  At one point, Hart describes the relationship 
between the internal point of view and the internal aspect of rules in the 
following way:  To mention the fact that members of the group regard the 
relevant pattern of behavior as both a standard of conduct and as giving rise 
to an obligation is, he says, “to refer to the internal aspect of rules seen from 
their internal point of view.”20 
Hart’s analysis of the concept of law employs this notion of a social rule 
in the following way:  The core element of law is, Hart argues, the “rule of 
recognition,” which is a fundamental social rule that is accepted as binding 
by a subgroup of persons within the larger society whom Hart designates as 
“officials.”21  The rule of recognition exists, like all Hartian social rules, as 
a certain kind of complex social practice, which in the case of the rule of 
recognition is a practice that holds not among all the members of the 
relevant society, but only among its officials.22  The rule of recognition 
serves two different but related roles.  First, it specifies criteria which 
identify which other rules are to count as valid laws of the relevant legal 
system. Second, it imposes on certain officials, including in particular 
judges, an obligation to apply and enforce those valid laws.  It bears 
emphasizing that the rule of recognition is, like all Hartian social rules 
which are accompanied by a particularly insistent demand for conformity, 
 
 17. See id. at 55-57. 
 18. Id. at 86. 
 19. Id. at 91-92. 
 20. Id. at 90. 
 21. Id. at 94-95, 100-10. 
 22. Id. at 110. 
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duty-imposing in its normative character.23  Judges and other officials hold 
the internal point of view toward the rule of recognition and hence regard it 
as “a public, common standard of correct judicial decision.”24  Other 
members of the society may or may not share the internal point of view, 
although it is a general requirement for the existence of a legal system that 
there be at least a minimal level of general compliance with the system’s 
rules.25  Some citizens comply because they themselves hold the internal 
point of view toward the rule of recognition (and, by extension, toward the 
rules it identifies as valid), but others only pay attention to the rules and 
comply with them to the extent that they have to, “because they judge that 
unpleasant consequences are likely to follow violation.”26  Hart maintains 
that such persons have adopted the “external point of view” towards the 
rules of their society, and continues, 
 At any given moment the life of any society which lives by rules, legal 
or not, is likely to consist in a tension between those who, on the one 
hand, accept and voluntarily co-operate in maintaining the rules, and so 
see their own and other persons’ behaviour in terms of the rules, and those 
who, on the other hand, reject the rules and attend to them only from the 
external point of view as a sign of possible punishment.27 
In a number of earlier articles, I criticized Hart for privileging the internal 
point of view over one version of the external point of view in a way that, I 
argued, he was not entitled to do.28  Scott Shapiro argued in response to that 
criticism that I had mischaracterized Hart’s understanding of the internal 
point of view:  Shapiro observed that Hart did not regard the internal point 
of view simply as the perspective of a legal insider, but meant it to refer, 
rather, to “the perspective of an insider who accepts the law’s legitimacy.”29  
We must be careful not to be misled by this formulation, since, as Shapiro 
is careful to note, Hart did not think that adopting the internal point of view 
entails that one accepts the moral legitimacy of law; Hart was quite explicit 
in his view that one can adopt the internal point of view for many different 
 
 23. Hart writes that the statement that someone is under a duty or obligation always 
implies the existence of a rule, but that the converse does not hold.  For example, rules of 
etiquette are taken to be reason-giving but not obligation-imposing. Id. at 85-86.  This is a 
complication which for present purposes we can ignore, however, since Hart makes clear 
that social rules in the legal context are always taken to be obligation-imposing. 
 24. Id. at 116. 
 25. Id. at 112-17. 
 26. Id. at 90. 
 27. Id. at 90-91. 
 28. Stephen R. Perry, Holmes Versus Hart:  The Bad Man in Legal Theory, in The Path 
of Law and Its Influence:  The Legacy of Oliver Wendell Holmes, Jr. 158 (Steven J. Burton 
ed., 2000) [hereinafter Perry, Holmes Versus Hart]; Stephen R. Perry, Interpretation and 
Methodology in Legal Theory, in Law and Interpretation 97 (Andrei Marmor ed., 1995) 
[hereinafter Perry, Interpretation and Methodology in Legal Theory].   
 29. Scott J. Shapiro, The Bad Man and the Internal Point of View, in The Path of the 
Law and Its Influence, supra note 28, at 197, 200.  Shapiro reiterates this point in Shapiro, 
supra note 2, at 1159. 
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reasons, including reasons of self-interest or a mere wish to conform.30  As 
regards Shapiro’s charge that I mischaracterized Hart’s position, it is 
certainly true that I took Hart to understand the internal point of view to be 
the normative perspective of a legal insider.  Shapiro is also correct to point 
out that Hart himself limited the appropriate perspective to that of an insider 
who accepts that the law gives rise to common binding standards for 
everyone in the relevant society.  The main point I was concerned to 
establish, however, was that Hart’s defense of his own theory of law does 
not exclude the possibility of theoretically privileging another kind of 
normative perspective that an insider might hold, and which could be 
regarded as a competitor to the internal point of view in Hart’s sense.  This 
is the perspective of Oliver Wendell Holmes’s famous bad man, who only 
complies with the law out of reasons of self-interest.31  This suggestion was 
not intended to show that a Holmesian theory of law is in fact a plausible or 
ultimately defensible view, but only, as I say, to point to what still seems to 
me to be a gap in Hart’s own argument.32  Whether or not I am right in 
thinking that such a gap exists, I accept Hart’s basic point that no plausible 
theory of law can do without the internal point of view in something like the 
sense he had in mind.  But it is theoretically preferable, I will argue, to free 
 
 30. Hart, supra note 1, at 203. 
 31. Oliver Wendell Holmes, The Path of the Law, 10 Harv. L. Rev. 457, 459-61 (1897). 
 32. My argument began with the observation that Hart had conflated two senses of the 
expression “external point of view.”  In one sense in which he uses the term, the external 
point of view is the perspective of an observer of the relevant social practice who is engaged 
in a process of theoretical reasoning and who describes the practice from, so to speak, the 
outside.  But Hart also uses the expression to refer to the perspective of someone like 
Holmes’s bad man, who pays attention to the law only for the self-interested reason that he 
wishes to avoid being subjected to sanctions.  The bad man is clearly a participant in the 
practice, not an observer, and he is engaging in a process of practical rather than theoretical 
reasoning.  I then pointed out that, because the bad man is an insider and a practical reasoner, 
his perspective might be thought of as a second kind of internal point of view which is in 
competition with Hart’s own understanding of that notion.  Finally, I suggested that Hart had 
not given us sufficient reason for privileging one insider’s perspective over the other.  I did 
not mean to suggest that a Holmesian theory of law could dispense completely with the 
internal point of view in Hart’s sense, since the notion of a rule, or of some similar 
normative notion, would undoubtedly be required to make sense of the practices of officials. 
See Perry, Holmes Versus Hart, supra note 28, at 196 n.69.  But Hart himself allows for the 
possibility that no one besides officials might adopt the internal point of view in his sense, 
Hart, supra note 1, at 117, and that is precisely what a Holmesian legal system would look 
like.  What I did not make clear in these earlier articles is that Hart’s analysis of social rules 
leaves him no choice but to say that a legal system could exist even if no one other than 
officials accepts the legitimacy of law.  I discuss the reasons for this in Part IV, infra.  At the 
time that I wrote those earlier articles, I also did not appreciate that Hart in fact held a non-
cognitivist theory of the meaning of legal statements.  As Scott Shapiro has pointed out to 
me, it is not at all clear why one could not offer a non-cognitivist analysis of legal statements 
understood as Holmesian threats which would explain their normativity in expressivist terms 
along lines very similar to Hart’s own account.  I discuss the non-cognitivist dimension of 
Hart’s analysis of legal statements in Part III, infra.  For an interesting discussion of what a 
Holmesian (or Hobbesian) theory of law might look like, see Claire Finkelstein, Hobbes and 
the Internal Point of View, 75 Fordham L. Rev. 1211 (2006). 
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the internal point of view from the conceptual link to a fundamental norm 
which takes the form of a Hartian social rule. 
To show this, it will be helpful to begin with a discussion of Hart’s 
famous distinction between the two types of rules which he calls primary 
and secondary.  It is, Hart maintained, in the combination of these two types 
of rules that the key to the science of jurisprudence can be found.33  
Secondary rules are meant, very roughly, to be the foundational rules of a 
legal system, whereas primary rules make up what I loosely referred to 
earlier as the system’s “regular” laws.  When Hart first introduces the 
distinction, he suggests that what distinguishes the two types of rules is a 
difference in their normative character:  Secondary rules are said to be 
power-conferring, whereas primary rules are meant to be duty-imposing.34  
This way of characterizing the distinction cannot be correct, however.35  
Although my concern in this essay is primarily with secondary rules, let me 
first make clear why primary rules cannot be regarded as exclusively duty-
imposing in nature.  It is evident from Hart’s general discussion of primary 
rules that he understands them to be norms that can be identified as valid 
laws in accordance with the criteria of validity which are specified by the 
relevant legal system’s rule of recognition.  Primary rules are simply valid 
rules of the system, and as such they can certainly impose obligations, but 
they can also create powers, rights, privileges, immunities, liabilities, and so 
on.  Hart says that the notion of validity brings with it a new way in which 
rules can exist, since a valid rule, unlike a social rule, can exist even if it is 
habitually ignored.36  There is, for example, a valid law against jaywalking 
 
 33. Hart, supra note 1, at 81. 
 34. Id. 
 35. It has often been remarked that Hart draws this important distinction in a number of 
different and ultimately inconsistent ways. See, e.g., Neil MacCormick, H.L.A. Hart 103-06 
(1981); Joseph Raz, The Authority of Law 177-79 (1979); P.M.S. Hacker, Hart’s Philosophy 
of Law, in Law, Morality, and Society:  Essays in Honour of H.L.A. Hart 1, 19-21 (P.M.S. 
Hacker and Joseph Raz eds., 1977); Stephen R. Perry, Hart’s Methodological Positivism, in 
Hart’s Postscript, supra note 5, at  311 n.4.  Besides the attempt to differentiate the two types 
of rules on the basis of their supposed character as duty-imposing in the one case and power-
conferring in the other, the other main way that Hart tries to draw the distinction 
characterizes secondary rules as “on a different level from the primary rules, for they are all 
about such rules.” Hart, supra note 1, at 94, 97.  Probably the best way to make sense of this 
claim that secondary rules are on a different level from primary rules is simply to take it as 
asserting that secondary rules play a constitutive or foundational role in legal systems.  The 
terminological picture is further complicated by the fact that Hart sometimes uses the term 
“primary rule” to mean not the valid rules of a legal system, but rather the customary rules of 
primitive or pre-legal societies. Id. at 91-92.  This is a particularly confusing usage because 
customary rules are, of course, the very class of norm that Hart’s notion of a social rule is 
meant to capture. 
 36. Hart, supra note 1, at 103, 109-10.  Note that it does not follow from the fact that a 
valid law is habitually ignored that it is not a norm in the sense I defined in Part I, since a 
valid law still has social existence conditions which refer, for example, to the fact that it was 
enacted by some legislative body.  Hart states that once we have a rule of recognition which 
specifies criteria of validity, the statement that a rule exists “may now be an internal 
statement applying an accepted but unstated rule of recognition and meaning (roughly) no 
more than ‘valid given the system’s criteria of validity.’” Id. at 110.  But the possibility of 
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in New York City, and this is true despite the fact that virtually everyone 
jaywalks there.  The notion of validity, in other words, marks out a set of 
existence conditions for a distinct class of norms which differ from social 
rules in at least two respects:  Their normative character is not restricted to 
imposing duties, and their existence does not require that they actually be 
observed. 
Just as primary rules turn out not to be exclusively duty-imposing in 
character, neither are secondary rules exclusively power-conferring.  Hart 
discusses three specific kinds of secondary rules in The Concept of Law.  
One of these is the rule of recognition, and the other two Hart calls rules of 
change and rules of adjudication.37  Rules of the latter two kinds are clearly 
power-conferring in nature.  A rule of change “empowers an individual or 
body of persons to introduce new primary rules for the conduct of the life of 
the group, or of some class within it, and to eliminate old rules,”38 whereas 
a rule of adjudication “empower[s] individuals to make authoritative 
determinations of the question whether, on a particular occasion, a primary 
rule has been broken.”39  In other words, a rule of change confers powers to 
legislate, whereas rules of adjudication create the various powers to apply 
the law and, more generally, to settle disputes, which we associate with 
courts.  The rule of recognition, however, is, as we have already seen, not 
power-conferring but duty-imposing:  It specifies whatever features a rule 
must possess in order to count as one of the legal system’s regular laws⎯to 
count, in Hart’s terminology, as a valid primary rule of the system⎯and it 
imposes on officials a duty to apply and enforce the rules which are thus 
identified as valid.  As Hart’s discussion of the relationship among these 
three types of rules proceeds, it becomes increasingly clear that he regards 
the rule of recognition as the theoretically dominant type of rule among the 
three, and indeed rules of change and rules of adjudication pretty quickly 
drop out of the picture altogether.  The only secondary rule that remains 
standing, so to speak, is the rule of recognition, which Hart repeatedly 
refers to as the ultimate rule of a legal system.40  Thus when Hart says that 
law is a combination of primary and secondary rules, one could be forgiven 
for thinking that what he means in the end is that law is a combination of a 
duty-imposing rule of recognition on the one hand, and the various rules 
that are identified by the rule of recognition as valid, on the other hand.  
Thus, despite the fact that at one point Hart explicitly characterizes 
secondary rules as power-conferring by their very nature, the view he 
 
such “internal” statements of existence does not preclude the possibility of “external” 
statements which assert that a given valid rule of a legal system exists because it meets 
certain social existence conditions, for example, that the legislature of the society in question 
has performed certain actions which, according to the society’s relevant (and practiced) rules 
of change and recognition, amount to the enactment of the rule as a law for that society. 
 37. Id. at 91-99. 
 38. Id. at 95. 
 39. Id. at 96. 
 40. Id. at 105-10. 
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eventually appears to settle on is that the most fundamental element in the 
foundational arrangements of a legal system is a rule that is duty-imposing. 
As I remarked earlier, there is a puzzle here.  Hart tells us that if we are 
to understand the regime of Rex, the absolute monarch, as involving law, 
then there must exist in his society a general social practice more complex 
than any that can be described in terms of habit and obedience.  Assuming 
for the moment that Hart is right to treat the relevant social practice as one 
involving norms, in the sense of “norm” that was defined in Part I, why 
should the most fundamental norm be duty-imposing rather than power-
conferring in nature?  The issue here concerns the relationship between the 
rule of recognition and the type of secondary rule that Hart calls a rule of 
change.  A rule of change is, as we saw a moment ago, a rule that confers 
on some person or body the power to legislate, which (again assuming that 
we should be looking to rules or norms at all) is presumably exactly the 
kind of rule that must exist if Rex can properly be said to have a right to 
rule.  Recall that the rule of recognition imposes on certain officials, and in 
particular on judges, the duty to apply and enforce a system’s primary rules.  
But judges cannot apply the primary rules unless there are some primary 
rules to be applied.  It is possible that, in a borderline case of a legal system, 
all the primary rules identified as valid by the rule of recognition might 
consist of preexisting customary rules that hold among the population at 
large or among some segment of the population;41 the rules of the old law 
merchant, for example, were of this kind.  But we do not have a central case 
of a legal system until there exists some person or body which is capable of 
enacting new rules, which means, in Hartian terms, that the system contains 
at least one rule of change.42  The puzzling aspect of Hart’s characterization 
of the theoretical foundations of law is that, while he provides a very 
detailed theoretical account of the nature of the rule of recognition, in the 
form of his general analysis of the existence conditions of social rules, he 
offers no corresponding theoretical account of the nature of the fundamental 
power-conferring rules that he calls rules of change.  This is particularly 
puzzling given his statement earlier in The Concept of Law that “the 
 
 41. Cf. MacCormick, supra note 35, at 111-18.  As an incidental point, it is interesting to 
observe that general customary practices of this kind, which are recognized as valid law by 
the rule of recognition, play a kind of dual role in Hart’s theory, because they are at the same 
time not only valid laws of the relevant legal system, but also social rules in Hart’s sense; the 
law merchant, for example, consisted of social rules among that class of citizens who 
regularly engaged with one another in certain kinds of commercial transactions. 
 42. MacCormick helpfully describes an imagined historical process in which a 
customary duty on the part of certain persons to apply existing customary rules⎯where the 
social rule giving rise to such a duty would amount, in effect, to a primitive rule of 
recognition⎯might gradually give way to a more complex social practice such that, at a 
certain point, “it becomes appropriate for the hermeneutic theorist to describe the position in 
terms of separate power-conferring secondary rules.” Id. at 116.  MacCormick points out that 
such a power-conferring rule might at first be limited to a power to modify existing 
customary rules⎯making it, in a quite literal and restricted sense, nothing more than a rule 
of change⎯but that it could evolve over time into a rule conferring a more general and 
unfettered power to legislate. Id. at 115-18. 
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introduction into society of rules enabling legislators to change and add to 
the rules of duty, and judges to determine when the rules of duty have been 
broken, is a step forward as important to society as the invention of the 
wheel.”43 
Hart tells us that there will be a very close connection between rules of 
change and rules of recognition, “for where the former exists the latter will 
necessarily incorporate a reference to legislation as an identifying feature of 
the rules, though it need not refer to all the details of procedure involved in 
legislation.”44  But this observation is not sufficient by itself to resolve the 
puzzle, unless we conceive of power-conferring rules as mere “fragments” 
of the antecedent clause of a rule of recognition which is itself conceived as 
a conditional directive imposing obligations of enforcement on officials.  
But the suggestion that power-conferring rules might in this way be 
conceived as “fragments of laws” is nothing more than the basic Kelsenian 
understanding of law which Hart forcefully and persuasively rejects at an 
earlier point in The Concept of Law.45  In rejecting the Kelsenian approach, 
Hart adverts to what he calls “the variety of laws,”46 by which he means the 
apparently irreducible normative diversity that we find among the kinds of 
rules that figure both in regular law and in the foundational arrangements of 
legal systems.47  But Hart’s insistence on the variety of laws makes it all the 
more puzzling that he did not formulate explicit existence conditions for 
power-conferring rules along the same lines as he did for the duty-imposing 
norms that he calls social rules, or at least that he did not offer some explicit 
theoretical account of the fundamental power to make law.  There would 
thus appear to be a significant omission at this point in Hart’s theory.  There 
is admittedly a certain elegant spareness to Hart’s theory as he presents it in 
The Concept of Law, since he argues that an instance of the very same kind 
of duty-imposing social rule which, in pre-legal societies, one finds in the 
form of separate freestanding customs,48 also lies at the foundations of 
every legal system:  A rule of recognition is, in essence, just the same kind 
of duty-imposing customary norm, except that it exists among a particular 
subgroup within law-possessing societies whom we would intuitively 
identify as officials, and more particularly, as judges.  However, elegance 
and theoretical spareness are not virtues if they obscure further complexity 
in the phenomena, and at the very least the theoretical picture as presented 
so far is incomplete. 
Hart tells us that the addition of secondary rules to a social system 
extends what can be said and done from the internal point of view, and that 
 
 43. Hart, supra note 1, at 41-42. 
 44. Id. at 96. 
 45. Id. at 33-42. 
 46. Id. at 26-49. 
 47. See id. at 41 (“[P]ower-conferring rules are thought of, spoken of, and used in social 
life differently from rules which impose duties, and they are valued for different reasons.  
What other tests for difference in character could there be?”). 
 48. Id. at 91-92. 
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this extension brings with it “a whole set of new concepts [which] demand a 
reference to the internal point of view for their analysis.”49  These concepts 
include, he goes on to say, “the notions of legislation, jurisdiction, validity, 
and, generally, of legal powers, private and public.”50  But since the internal 
point of view is characterized by reference to a type of rule whose 
normative character is limited to the imposition of duties, how is the 
analysis which yields these other normative concepts supposed to proceed?  
We have already rejected the Kelsenian possibility that duty-conferring 
rules are “mere fragments” of the rule of recognition itself, which would 
seem to suggest that rules of change are, as Hart’s general description of 
them in any event suggests, distinct rules in their own right.  But what form 
do these distinct rules take?  Perhaps it might be suggested that they are 
themselves valid rules, which are identified as such by the criteria of 
validity specified by the rule of recognition.  It is, after all, common enough 
in modern legal systems that at least some lawmaking powers derive from 
primary rules, in the sense of “primary rule” which means simply a valid 
law.  Think, for example, of regulatory agencies which are created by 
ordinary legislation and given delegated rulemaking powers.  Perhaps rules 
of change are not, after all, secondary rules in the same fundamental sense 
as the rule of recognition, but are, rather, simply very important primary 
rules, meaning rules which the rule of recognition identifies as valid.   
Suppose, for example, that we wish to account for the rule of change that 
confers lawmaking powers on a distinct legislature, meaning a lawmaking 
body distinct from the courts themselves.  For ease of expression, let me 
call this rule of change the legislative rule.  Suppose further that there is a 
rule of recognition in the society in question which holds among those 
officials whom we would intuitively recognize as the society’s judges, and 
that this rule of recognition identifies three possible sources of law:  first, 
enactments of the legislature which meet certain requirements of form and 
procedure; second, certain precedents of the courts themselves; and third, 
various forms of custom which exist within the society as a whole or within 
some segment of the society.  If the legislative rule is a valid law, the source 
of its validity cannot, on pain of circularity, be one of the legislature’s own 
legislative acts.  Since precedent is a source of law in this legal system it 
follows that courts have certain lawmaking powers, so it is at least 
conceivable that the validity of the legislative rule could be traced to a 
lawmaking act on the part of the courts.  But this does not help us very 
much, theoretically speaking, since the source of the courts’ own 
lawmaking powers is presumably itself a rule of change, and it is the 
general theoretical status of such rules that we are trying to explain.  
Explaining one rule of change by reference to another is not helpful if we 
do not have a theoretical account of rules of change in general.  So let us set 
this possibility aside for the time being. 
 
 49. Id. at 98. 
 50. Id. at 98-99. 
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This leaves custom as a potential source of validity for the legislative 
rule.  This is a more promising possibility, since, just as the law merchant, 
consisting of customary practices among merchants, can be identified by 
the rule of recognition as a source of valid law, why cannot the customary 
practices of another group of officials, namely those officials whom we 
would intuitively identify as members of the legislature, similarly be a 
source of valid law?  This suggestion seems fine so far as it goes, but it runs 
up against the difficulty that, as Neil MacCormick observes, “acts which 
constitute custom [in the sense of the law merchant] are not power-
exercising acts,” so that “[e]ither the acts ‘add up to’ legal custom or they 
do not.”51  But this point alone does not show that the suggestion is not 
along the right lines, since just as there can be duty-imposing customary 
rules, such as those which constitute the law merchant and the rule of 
recognition itself, perhaps there can also be power-conferring customary 
rules.   
At this point, three observations are in order.  First, and most obviously, 
the suggestion that rules of change are a distinct kind of customary rule, 
namely those customary rules which are power-conferring in nature, will 
not take us very far unless we provide a theoretical account of such rules, 
along the lines of the account Hart provides of customary duty-imposing 
rules.  This is, however, just another way of stating that there is an omission 
at this point in Hart’s theory; pointing to the mere possibility of power-
conferring customary rules does not, by itself, suffice to rectify the 
omission.  Second, once we have concluded that the legislative rule consists 
of the customary practices of a group of officials besides judges, it is not 
clear that there is much to be gained by referring to the rule as one that the 
rule of recognition identifies as valid.  Certainly any new rules that are 
enacted by the legislature in accordance with the legislative rule will be 
identified as valid, and for that reason, there will be, as Hart observes, a 
close connection between the legislative rule and the rule of recognition:  
“[W]here the former exists the latter will necessarily incorporate a reference 
to legislation as an identifying feature of the [enacted] rules. . . .”52  But it is 
not clear what is to be gained by referring to the legislative rule itself as a 
valid rule, since by hypothesis it is a customary rule like the rule of 
recognition, and as such it must exist as a certain kind of complex social 
practice among officials, albeit a different group of officials from those 
whose practice constitutes the rule of recognition.53  Probably the better 
 
 51. MacCormick, supra note 35, at 115.  MacCormick does not refer specifically to the 
example of the law merchant, but this is clearly the kind of customary practice that he has in 
mind. 
 52. Hart, supra note 1, at 96. 
 53. The following remarks by MacCormick seem apposite in this regard: 
[I]f in a constitutional state one criterion of recognition of rules binding on judges 
is that they be rules validly enacted by the legislature, the “validity” of a legislative 
act does not depend on the rule of recognition itself directly.  Legislation is validly 
enacted if it satisfies the constitutional provision (a Hartian rule of change) 
governing the legislature’s power.  As such, it yields a valid or binding ground of 
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theoretical characterization of the situation is precisely the one that Hart 
initially offers, namely, that we have two distinct kinds of secondary rule, 
where “secondary rule” is understood to refer to a norm which is both 
customary in nature and part of the foundational arrangements of a legal 
system.54  The third observation concerns precedent as a distinct source of 
law.  If rules of change are to be explained as a distinct kind of customary 
rule, namely a power-conferring customary rule, and if certain acts of the 
courts can themselves give rise to law, then the social practices of the courts 
must involve two separate customary rules, one of which is duty-
imposing⎯the rule of recognition⎯and one of which is power-
conferring⎯the rule of change that underlies the doctrine of precedent.  The 
two rules will be closely related in the sense that the rule of recognition will 
refer to the doctrine of precedent as a source of law, but they will 
nonetheless be distinct rules.  There is, however, nothing problematic about 
the idea that more than one customary rule can coexist among the same 
group of persons. 
Perhaps the point of the preceding discussion can be restated in the 
following way.  Once we have rejected the Kelsenian possibility that all 
laws are, at bottom, directions to officials to apply sanctions, we require at 
least two different kinds of fundamental rules within a legal system as 
conceived by Hart.  First, we require a rule of recognition, which identifies 
other rules as valid laws and imposes on certain officials, and in particular 
on judges, the duty to apply and enforce such valid laws.  We also require, 
however, at least one fundamental instance of the kind of power-conferring 
rule which Hart calls a rule of change.  This must be a distinct rule because 
even if power-conferring rules could all be reduced to duty-imposing 
rules—a possibility that will be considered but rejected in the following 
part—the rule of change as thus conceived would impose duties on a 
different group of persons from the rule of recognition.  Whereas the rule of 
recognition imposes duties on judges, a rule of change gives some person or 
body—let us suppose, for ease of convenience, that it is a legislature—the 
power to impose duties on a much broader group of persons, including in 
 
judicial decision.  This in turn implies a judicial duty to apply the constitutional 
provision.  It does not follow that the rule of recognition makes the constitution 
“valid” in any other sense. 
MacCormick, supra note 35, at 115. 
 54. Hart of course also refers to a third kind of power-conferring secondary rule, namely 
rules of adjudication. MacCormick offers a plausible historical reconstruction of how a 
customary social rule imposing upon certain specified individuals (for example, village 
elders) a duty to settle disputes might, as a distinct judiciary emerged, evolve into a 
customary power-conferring rule of adjudication, which in turn would be subject, as a true 
and unfettered rule of change evolved, to modification by statute.  “The ‘rules of 
adjudication’ became validly enacted new rules, created by exercise of parliament’s power 
of change.  Judges and other senior lawyers and officials were committed to accepting each 
change as valid because conformable to the developed criteria of recognition accepted by 
them from the internal point of view.” Id. at 119.  It is thus possible that rules of adjudication 
are not, after all, secondary rules as defined in the text, but are, rather, simply valid primary 
rules of the relevant legal system. 
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particular all the subjects of the relevant legal system.  Furthermore, since 
for Hart fundamental rules can only exist as customary social practices, 
presumably at least this one particular rule of change must likewise consist 
of a customary practice.  If the fundamental rule of change confers power 
on a legislature then it would be natural to conceive of the rule as, at least as 
a first approximation, a power-conferring rule which exists as a customary 
practice among that group of persons whom we intuitively think of as 
legislators.55  If this is correct then Hart’s paradigmatic example of a rule of 
recognition, namely, “What the Queen in Parliament enacts is law,”56 is in 
fact best conceived as a complex statement of two different rules:  The first, 
which could be rephrased as something like “The Queen in Parliament has 
the power to enact valid law for all the Queen’s subjects,” is a rule of 
change.  The second, which could be rephrased along the lines of “The 
courts have the duty to apply valid law, including in particular whatever 
laws are enacted by the Queen in Parliament,” is a rule of recognition.  
Normatively and conceptually these are distinct rules, and this would be so 
even if the most fundamental rule of change was a customary rule that held 
not among legislators but rather among the judges themselves.  As was 
noted in the preceding paragraph, there is no reason why two distinct 
customary rules cannot coexist among one and the same group.  Even if 
judges and legislators were the same persons, their role as judges would be 
governed by one kind of rule, whereas their role as legislators would be 
governed by quite another kind of rule. 
III.  RECTIFYING THE OMISSION:  TWO POSSIBLE STRATEGIES 
We can summarize the discussion of the preceding part as follows.  Hart 
says that law is the union of primary and secondary rules.  Primary rules are 
just the regular laws of the legal system; they are rules which possess the 
property of legal validity.  Secondary rules are the fundamental or 
foundational rules of a legal system.  They do not possess the property of 
validity, but exist only as complex social practices among officials.  Hart 
points to three specific types of social rules, namely rules of recognition, 
rules of change, and rules of adjudication.  Rules of recognition are duty-
imposing, whereas rules of change and rules of adjudication are power-
 
 55. Notice that this description would be a first approximation only because 
sophisticated legal systems regulate their own character and content and so can, by the 
enactment of valid laws or the adoption of appropriate constitutional changes, modify in 
various ways the makeup of the legislature, its rules of procedure, etc.  But the same point of 
course also holds true of the rules governing, say, the jurisdiction and procedures of the 
courts, even though the rule of recognition only exists, for Hart, as a customary practice 
among judges.  Perhaps the most appropriate characterization of the situation in both cases is 
to say that fundamental customary practices can change over time, and sometimes such 
changes have legal sources.  But just as it is true for changes in the rule of recognition that, 
as Hart says, “all that succeeds is success,” Hart, supra note 1, at 153, presumably a parallel 
point also holds of changes in the fundamental power-conferring rule that is constituted by 
the customary practices of legislators. 
 56. Id. at 107. 
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conferring.  The rule of recognition is said to be a special case of a social 
rule.  Hart analyzes the notion of a social rule in some detail, by specifying 
a set of existence conditions for such rules.  Since social rules are, in their 
nature, duty-imposing,57 Hart’s analysis of a social rule is a general account 
of how duty-imposing rules can exist simply as social practices.  It is an 
account, in other words, of one kind of duty-imposing norm, in the sense of 
the term “norm” that was defined in Part I.  More specifically, it is an 
account of duty-imposing customary norms.  The omission in Hart’s theory 
of law to which I have drawn attention is his failure to offer an explicit 
analysis of the fundamental power-conferring rules which would 
correspond to his analysis of the rule of recognition.  I have suggested that 
for Hart such rules are, like social rules, customary in nature.  What is 
required, then, is an account of how customary rules can be power-
conferring and not just duty-imposing. 
There would appear to be two possible strategies that one might adopt to 
rectify this omission.  The first strategy, which would involve treating 
power-conferring rules as a type of customary norm completely distinct 
from duty-imposing rules, would require the specification of a separate set 
of existence conditions for such rules which would nonetheless be of the 
same general kind as those which Hart describes for duty-imposing rules.  
The second strategy would, by contrast, show how power-conferring 
customary rules can be reduced to duty-imposing customary rules.  If the 
second strategy could be carried out successfully, then all three types of 
secondary rules which Hart discusses could be shown to be Hartian social 
rules, meaning duty-imposing customary rules.  I will discuss these two 
possible strategies in turn.   
Before directly addressing the question of whether Hart could avail 
himself of the first strategy, it will be helpful if we first recall the general 
nature of Hart’s project in The Concept of Law.  Hart is, in the first 
instance, concerned to show that the sanction- and prediction-based theories 
of law and of legal obligation that had been advanced by Bentham, Austin, 
and the Scandinavian realists are untenable.  It is important to bear in mind 
that those theories were reductivist in character, and that the central concept 
with which they began, and which they were trying reductively to eliminate, 
was that of an obligation.  Normative concepts were to be replaced by 
concepts that were consistent with an empiricist epistemology and a 
naturalistic view of the world.  But the early positivists had no use for the 
idea of authority or normative power as an organizing concept of law; it 
was too closely bound up with the natural law views to which they were 
reacting, and in any event it was far too mysterious and elusive a notion to 
lend itself very readily to direct reductivist analysis.58  Obligation, though, 
 
 57. This is a slight oversimplification. See supra note 23. 
 58. Bentham not only argued that all laws are reducible to commands, but he also 
explicitly argued that all power-conferring laws are reducible to conditional commands of 
various kinds.  This latter aspect of Bentham’s reductivist program is discussed by Hart in 
H.L.A. Hart, Essays on Bentham 194-219 (1982). 
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was a concept they could work with, since it seemed easily replaceable by 
the notion of an order or command, which in turn seemed straightforwardly 
analyzed by reference to such nonnormative concepts as prediction, threats, 
or sanctions.59  Hart argues persuasively that such reductions cannot be 
successful, and that the concept of obligation could not, after all, be 
dispensed with as readily as his predecessors imagined.  He points out, for 
example, that if an obligation was simply a prediction that failure to 
perform the required act will be met with hostile reaction, then it would be a 
contradiction, which it obviously is not, to say that one has an obligation 
but that one has, for whatever reason, completely avoided the possibility of 
being subjected to such a reaction.60 
Despite Hart’s rejection of his predecessors’ sanction- and prediction-
based theories of law, he nonetheless shared their commitment to 
naturalism and empiricism.  As Raz has pointed out, these commitments 
lead him to analyze normative statements as having both a cognitivist and a 
non-cognitivist dimension.  Thus, the meaning of a legal statement made 
from the internal point of view⎯for example, “It is the law of Pennsylvania 
that everyone has an obligation to do X”—involves, according to Raz’s 
account of Hart’s semantics, a kind of hybrid, “stating how things are under 
the law, while endorsing or expressing an endorsement of the law at the 
same time.”61  On this view, all internal legal statements have truth 
conditions which derive from the general social practice that constitutes the 
rule of recognition.  There is thus an ascertainable fact of the matter as to 
whether or not Pennsylvania has a law to the effect that everyone has an 
obligation to do X, and we can ascertain what the facts are by looking, for 
example, to the past activities of Pennsylvania’s legislature.  However, the 
meaning of the normative aspect of an internal legal statement has nothing 
to do with whether the residents of Pennsylvania do or do not, in fact, have 
 
 59. See, e.g., John Austin, The Province of Jurisprudence Determined 24-25 (Wilfrid E. 
Rumble ed., 1995). 
 60. Hart, supra note 1, at 84. 
 61. Joseph Raz, Two Views of the Nature of Law:  A Partial Comparison, 4 Legal 
Theory 249, 253 (1998); see also Raz, H.L.A. Hart (1907-1992), supra note 3, at 147-49; 
Raz, The Purity of the Pure Theory, supra note 3, at 447-48, 454.  Hart explicitly states that 
he accepts a non-cognitivist analysis of legal statements in Hart, supra note 58, at 158-60.  
Kevin Toh makes a careful and detailed case for the view that Hart is a norm-expressivist, 
meaning that he adopts an expressivist semantic strategy in combination with non-
cognitivism to explain the meaning of statements containing normative terms. Kevin Toh, 
Hart’s Expressivism and His Benthamite Project, 11 Legal Theory 75 (2005).  Scott Shapiro 
appears to offer a similar view of Hart’s semantics in Shapiro, supra note 2, at 1168-70.  As 
I understand them, both Toh and Shapiro differ from Raz in that they regard Hart’s analysis 
of the meaning of internal legal statements as fully non-cognitivist, and not, as Raz would 
have it, as a hybrid view containing both cognitivist and non-cognitivist components.  
Nothing turns on this difference for present purposes.  Raz, however, does not appear to 
regard Hart’s non-cognitivism as a form of norm-expressivism, suggesting instead that it 
grows out of J.L. Austin’s theory of performative utterances which can have various kinds of 
illocutionary force. See, e.g., Raz, H.L.A. Hart (1907-1992), supra note 3, at 149.  Austin’s 
most complete statement of his theory of performative utterances is to be found in J.L. 
Austin, How To Do Things with Words (1962). 
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an obligation to do X.  It consists, rather, in the expressed endorsement of 
the relevant standard of conduct as obligatory for all those who fall within 
the standard’s scope.62  This endorsement is expressed through the adoption 
of the internal point of view, which consists not of a belief that the law 
gives rise to obligations, but rather of an attitude of accepting the law as 
obligatory.63  Attitudes, unlike beliefs, cannot be true or false.  Thus, 
although Hart is not, strictly speaking, a reductivist about legal normativity 
since he is not trying to reduce normative concepts to nonnormative 
concepts as his positivist predecessors were, there is nonetheless a certain 
affinity between his view and theirs, because his non-cognitivist 
explanation of normativity does not involve an account of how law might 
actually or potentially give rise to true obligations.   
Hart’s commitments to naturalism and empiricism thus lead him, as the 
similar commitments of Austin, Bentham, and the Scandinavian realists had 
earlier led them, to explain the normativity of law in a way which does not 
depend on the possibility that law does or might systematically give rise to 
actual changes in anybody’s obligations.64  But such an approach to 
normativity has theoretical consequences, one of which is to increase the 
difficulty of pursuing the first possible strategy that was mentioned earlier 
for rectifiying the omission in Hart’s theory.  The omission, it will be 
recalled, is Hart’s failure to provide an explicit analysis of a legal system’s 
most fundamental power-conferring rules, and the suggested strategy is to 
offer an account of the existence conditions of such rules that would parallel 
Hart’s analysis of duty-imposing rules.  If one thinks that normativity is 
appropriately explained by reference to a certain kind of attitude, then the 
general contours of the account that one will be inclined to offer of the 
existence conditions of duty-imposing customary rules seem intuitive 
enough.  One will point, as Hart does, to the fact that under certain 
circumstances everyone in a group tends to behave the same way, and one 
will also point, as Hart does, to the fact that this regular pattern of behavior 
is accompanied by a “critical reflective attitude” which disposes persons to 
endorse the pattern as a binding standard of conduct, to criticize behavior 
that deviates from the pattern, and so on.  But how would one go about 
offering a parallel analysis of the existence conditions of a power-
conferring customary norm?  Given that Hart’s non-cognitivism has its 
 
 62. This would appear to be Hart’s view about the meaning not only of internal 
statements of validity such as “It is the law of Pennsylvania that everyone has an obligation 
to do X,” but also of internal statements to the effect that the rule of recognition itself is 
obligatory for officials. Cf. Toh, supra note 61, at 90-91. 
 63. As was pointed out in the Introduction, the internal point of view serves a dual role 
in Hart’s theory of law.  It both specifies one of the constitutive elements of a social rule, and 
it helps to explain the normative dimension of the meaning of internal legal statements. 
 64. The earlier positivists would allow that law can, qua law, give rise to changes in a 
person’s normative situation, since laws are orders backed by threats and threats can give 
rise to prudential reasons for action.  Hart, by contrast, would appear to be committed to the 
view that law, qua law, does not give rise to any reasons that can be characterized as 
specifically legal in nature. 
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origins in J.L. Austin’s theory of performatives,65 one might begin by 
pointing to the fact that just as promisors make certain kinds of utterances 
with the intention of effecting a certain kind of change in the world, 
namely, a change in their own normative situation such that they come 
under an obligation which they did not previously have, so too do 
legislators make utterances⎯or, more generally, perform certain kinds of 
acts, which for present purposes we can call “legislative” acts⎯with the 
intention of changing the normative situation of some or all of the subjects 
of the relevant legal system.  We can think of a lawmaking act as an 
assertion made under certain formalized circumstances that is meant to have 
illocutionary force; more specifically, it is an assertion that is uttered 
precisely with the intention of changing the normative situation of others.  
Perhaps one might then characterize the power-conferring rule itself as the 
general practice, on the part of appropriately designated persons or some 
appropriately designated body of persons acting collectively, of engaging in 
such legislative acts with the intention of changing the normative situation 
of other persons. 
The difficulty to which this sketch of an account of customary power-
conferring rules would seem to give rise, however, concerns the fact that if 
we are to take seriously the idea of a customary power-conferring rule, 
presumably the general social practice of engaging in legislative acts must 
itself have some meaning or significance for those persons, namely 
legislators, whose conduct is supposed to be guided by the rule.  There 
must, in other words, be some analogue, in the case of power-conferring 
rules, of the internal aspect of a duty-imposing social rule.  In the case of 
the latter kind of rule, the internal aspect consists, it will be recalled, of an 
attitude of endorsing the relevant pattern of conduct as obligatory, a 
willingness to criticize those who deviate from it, and so on.  Presumably 
the analogue of the internal aspect of a duty-imposing rule is, in the case of 
a power-conferring rule, not just an intention to change the normative 
situation of others by performing a certain act, but an intention to change 
the normative situation of others by means of an act which invokes the very 
rule in question.66  This means, however, that the person performing the act 
must have some concept of the power-conferring rule, so as to be able to 
invoke it when engaging in the relevant illocutionary act.  Notice that in the 
case of duty-imposing customary rules, it is not strictly necessary, at least in 
the case of categorical rules, that those whose general behavior and attitudes 
comprise the rule must have a concept of the rule; it would appear to be 
sufficient to meet the existence conditions of such a rule that members of 
 
 65. See supra note 61.  Hart explicitly characterizes lawmaking acts in terms of 
Austinian performatives in Hart, supra note 58, at 260. 
 66. Cf. MacCormick, supra note 35, at 73 (“The key point . . . is that all the acts which 
are acts of exercising the so-called power are acts which necessarily and intrinsically invoke 
the rule in some way.”).  MacCormick takes this to be a truth which any account of 
normative powers must acknowledge, but this is not so; it is possible to offer accounts of 
normative powers which are not rule- or practice-based. 
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the relevant group generally conform their behavior to the relevant pattern 
of conduct, adopt the attitude that the pattern of conduct is a required or 
obligatory standard, are disposed to criticize departures from the pattern, 
and so on.67  As Hart writes, 
 The use of unstated rules of recognition, by courts and others, in 
identifying particular rules of the system is characteristic of the internal 
point of view.  Those who use them in this way thereby manifest their 
own acceptance of them as guiding rules and with this attitude there goes 
a characteristic vocabulary different from the natural expressions of the 
external point of view.  Perhaps the simplest of these is the expression, ‘It 
is the law that . . .’.68 
In the case of a power-conferring rule, however, legislators would 
presumably have to be able to state the rule in order to invoke it; they would 
have to be able, in other words, to treat it as an internal legal statement.  
The statement of the rule would presumably take something like the 
following conditional form:  “If appropriately designated legislators utter 
 
 67. Perhaps it might be suggested that Hart’s analysis of internal legal statements of 
obligation similarly appears to require that those who make such statements must have a 
concept of the underlying rule, since he often describes the attitudinal aspect of internal 
statements in such terms as “endorse as binding” or “regard as obligatory.”  The suggestion 
would be, in effect, that one cannot endorse a pattern of conduct as obligatory unless one 
possesses the concept of obligation, and, for Hart at least, one cannot possess the concept of 
obligation unless one possesses the concept of a rule.  If this suggestion is correct, then 
Hart’s account of categorical duty-imposing social rules would be subject to a difficulty 
similar to that which I argue in the text arises for power-conferring rules.  One possible 
response that might be made on Hart’s behalf is that his non-cognitivism is limited to legal 
statements and does not apply to moral statements.  If that is so, then he could with complete 
propriety maintain that the attitudinal aspect of legal statements can express an endorsement 
that utilizes the moral concept of obligatoriness.  Moreover, he could allow for the 
possibility that legal statements can express moral endorsement and still consistently 
maintain, as in fact he does, that the meaning of normative terms is different in moral and 
legal discourse. See Hart, supra note 58, at 146-47.  He could maintain this latter view 
because the meaning of legal statements would be explained in non-cognitivist terms and by 
reference to the existence of rules of a certain kind, whereas his account of the meaning of 
moral statements would presumably be a cognitivist one, and hence would treat such 
statements as capable of being true or false.  If, however, Hart was motivated to be a non-
cognitivist about legal statements at least partly by his commitments to naturalism and 
empiricism, then it is difficult to see why he would not be a non-cognitivist about all 
normative statements, including moral statements.  In that case, Hart’s use of such terms as 
“regard as obligatory” to describe the attitudinal aspect of normative statements would 
presumably have to be understood as shorthand for expressions of (nonmoral) approval of a 
pattern of conduct, or something along those lines.  In any event, since Hart is quite clear 
that one can adopt the internal point of view for nonmoral reasons, Hart, supra note 1, at 
203, it follows that he does not regard the non-cognitivist dimension of legal statements as 
necessarily involving moral endorsement.  There are, moreover, some textual indications that 
Hart did in fact originally intend his analysis of social rules, and hence his non-cognitivism, 
to apply to moral as well as to legal statements of obligation, as, for example, when he writes 
that the statement that someone has an obligation (including, presumably, a moral 
obligation) implies the existence of a rule. Id. at 85.  However, in the Postcript to the second 
edition of The Concept of Law, Hart states that he no longer regards his “practice theory of 
rules” as a sound explanation of morality, “either individual or social.” Id. at 256. 
 68. Hart, supra note 1, at 102 (emphasis added). 
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such and such words under such and such circumstances, then the residents 
of Pennsylvania come under an obligation to do X.” 
The difficulty that arises here is a variation on the so-called Frege-Geach 
problem, which in its general form concerns the fact that normative 
predicates are used in various contexts where they are not actually being 
asserted, whereas the basic non-cognitivist analysis of the meaning of 
normative expressions applies to their use in assertions.69  The problem in 
the present case is not so much with the antecedent clause of the conditional 
statement of the legislative rule as it is with the consequent clause.  
Presumably legislators do not think of the rule as one which states that if 
they perform the appropriate legislative acts, then the residents of 
Pennsylvania will thereby be caused to do X, to endorse the doing of X as a 
required standard of conduct, etc.  They think of the rule, rather, as one that 
states that if they perform the relevant legislative acts, the residents of 
Pennsylvania will come under an obligation to do X.  Similarly, when 
legislators actually invoke the rule with a view to exercising the relevant 
power, the mental state that accompanies this action is not appropriately 
described as a practical attitude like endorsement, but rather as an intention 
to place someone else under an obligation.  Furthermore, such an attitude is 
presumably normally accompanied by a belief that there is some fact of the 
matter about what the other person’s current normative status is, as well as 
a belief that one’s action has succeeded (or not) in changing that status.  
The difficulty, in other words, is that the statement and use of power-
conferring rules are much less amenable to a non-cognitivist semantic 
analysis than is the case for categorical duty-imposing rules.  I of course do 
not mean to suggest that there are no responses to such difficulties that 
could be offered on behalf of Hart, and the literature on non-cognitivism 
and norm-expressivism offers many technical resources that might be 
drawn on for these purposes.70  My main concern, rather, is simply to point 
out that the non-cognitivist aspect of Hart’s views gives rise to more serious 
difficulties for his theory of law than perhaps has been appreciated in the 
past. 
 
 69. See P.T. Geach, Ascriptivism, 69 Phil. Rev. 221 (1960); P.T. Geach, Assertion, 74 
Phil. Rev. 449 (1965).  Both articles are reprinted in P.T. Geach, Logic Matters (1972).  
Interestingly, one of Geach’s primary targets in the first of these articles was an early article 
of Hart’s, in which Hart offers an ascriptivist analysis of attributions of action and 
responsibility. H.L.A. Hart, The Ascription of Responsibility and Rights, 49 Proc. 
Aristotelian Soc’y 171 (1949).  As Kevin Toh points out, Hart states in the preface to 
Punishment and Responsibility that Geach’s criticism of the latter article is justified, and that 
he no longer considers its main contentions to be defensible. Toh, supra note 61, at 102 
(discussing H.L.A. Hart, Punishment and Responsibility (1968)).  Toh goes on to express the 
view that “the apparent inconsistency between Hart’s disowning of his ascriptivism and . . . 
his adherence to expressivism can[not] be eliminated.” Id. 
 70. For proposed solutions to the Frege-Geach problem, see, e.g., Simon Blackburn, 
Spreading the Word 181-223 (1984); Allan Gibbard, Wise Choices, Apt Feelings 83-102 
(1990); Simon Blackburn, Attitudes and Contents, 98 Ethics 501 (1988).  As Toh points out, 
the viability of these proposals remains controversial. Toh, supra note 61, at 102. 
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There is, however, as I previously indicated, another possible strategy 
that might be available in order to rectify the omission from the theory of 
The Concept of Law that I have been discussing.  Instead of offering an 
analysis of power-conferring rules considered as a distinct type of 
customary rule in their own right, the alternative strategy would attempt to 
reduce all power-conferring rules to duty-imposing rules.  Hart does, in 
fact, propose at least a partial reductive analysis along these lines in the 
following passage from his later work Essays on Bentham: 
[T]he general recognition in a society of [a] commander’s words as 
peremptory reasons for action is equivalent to the existence of a social 
rule.  Regarded in one way as providing a general guide and standard of 
evaluation for the conduct of the commander’s subjects, this rule might be 
formulated as the rule that the commander is to be obeyed and so would 
appear as a rule imposing obligations on the subject.  Regarded in another 
way as conferring authority on the commander and providing him with a 
guide to the scope or manner of exercise it would be formulated as the 
rule that the commander may by issuing commands create obligations for 
his subjects and would be regarded as a rule conferring legal powers upon 
him.71 
Hart here makes the suggestion that a certain kind of duty-imposing social 
rule is, in effect, equivalent to a power-conferring rule.  In the example, the 
relevant rule is not simply a practice of officials (or of a sole “commander” 
like Rex), but is rather a society-wide practice of treating the commander’s 
word as binding.  Members of the larger society regard themselves, in 
effect, as bound by the practice in a conditional rather than a categorical 
way; the content of the duty is conditioned on the say-so of the commander, 
who for that reason can be regarded as doing something that is functionally 
or perhaps even logically equivalent to exercising a power when he tells his 
subjects to do this or to do that. 
Ingenious as this suggestion is, it is not clear to what extent it can rectify 
the omission in the argument in The Concept of Law that we have been 
discussing.  There are two reasons for this.  The first concerns various 
difficulties that arise when we inquire how the members of the relevant 
group conceptualize their own normative practices.  Notice, to begin, that 
Hart is clearly correct when he claims that there can be duty-imposing 
social rules in his sense which are conditional in nature.  Notice further, 
though, that the type of event which triggers the conditional rule need not 
be the command of a commander, but could be almost anything:  If the 
harvest is good, we must have a harvest festival; if we triumph in battle, we 
must have a great victory celebration and ritually kill all our prisoners.  In 
the latter case, for example, there will be a Hartian social rule if, on the 
occasion of triumphing in battle, the members of the group generally hold a 
great victory celebration, adopt the internal point of view towards the 
 
 71. Hart, supra note 58, at 258.  I thank Scott Shapiro for drawing this passage to my 
attention. 
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practice of holding such a celebration, criticize one another for not taking 
part in the ritual killing of prisoners, and so on.  Hart is also correct that 
there could be a general conditional social rule which makes obligatory 
conduct dependent on the intentional say-so of a commander.  If whenever 
Rex tells his people to do X, they in fact generally do X, endorse the doing 
of X, criticize one another for not doing X, and so on, then it seems 
unproblematic to say that we have a Hartian social rule which is both 
conditional and general, and in which Rex’s commands are, in Hart’s 
phrase, “content-independent,”72 meaning that members of the group treat a 
practice as obligatory simply on the say-so of Rex, regardless of what the 
content of his say-so is.  If Rex says do X, they do X.  If Rex says do not do 
X, they do not do X. 
If the members of the group simply have a general conditional practice 
of the kind just discussed, then, as I say, there would appear to be no 
problem in saying that the practice is a certain kind of Hartian social rule.  
Matters are not quite so straightforward, however, if we ask how they 
conceptualize this practice to themselves.  Perhaps they have no 
conceptualization of the practice, but simply do what Rex tells them to do 
whenever he tells them to do something, and in the process adopt the 
internal point of view towards whatever it is that Rex has told them to do, 
criticize one another for failing to do this thing, and so on.  It is perfectly 
conceivable that there could exist such a complex Hartian social rule 
without the participants having a concept of their own practice.  As Hart 
observes, perhaps the rule is not explicitly stated, but is simply manifested 
by its use.73  But if members of the group do have such a concept, what is 
its content?  Do they say to themselves, we have a practice such that when 
Rex tells us to do X, we generally do X, we regard X as required behavior, 
we criticize one another for not doing X, and so on?  This seems highly 
unlikely.  Presumably, if they think of themselves as having a rule, they 
think that if Rex tells them to do X, they have an obligation to do X.  In 
other words, because the formulation of the rule as an internal statement 
must be conditional in form, any attempt to understand its meaning in non-
cognitivist terms will run into Frege-Geach difficulties of the kind 
discussed earlier. 
As I indicated, the Frege-Geach problem may not arise for members of 
the relevant group if they do not have a concept of their own practice.  
Notice, though, that even if the problem does not arise for Rex’s subjects, it 
may nonetheless arise for Rex himself.  If Rex thinks of himself as issuing 
commands, or as otherwise engaging in lawmaking activity, then 
presumably he thinks of himself as engaging in action that will actually 
obligate his subjects and not simply cause them all to do X, to endorse X as 
required behavior, and so on.  Possibly this is not a significant problem if 
we are dealing with a society-wide social rule, because so long as everyone 
 
 72. Id. at 259. 
 73. Hart, supra note 1, at 102. 
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does what Rex says and does so with the requisite attitude, perhaps we can 
simply ignore Rex’s conceptualization of the situation.  If, however, we are 
not dealing with a society-wide social rule, but with one that holds only 
among legislators,74 then the difficulty reappears in a more acute form.  
Unless the relevant social rule is understood as a Kelsenian direction to 
judges to apply sanctions under various circumstances⎯and as we have 
seen, Hart forcefully rejects this possibility⎯then presumably legislators 
must think of themselves as being guided by a rule such that, if they act in 
certain ways, their subjects will come under an obligation to do such and 
such.  In that case, however, the practice of legislators among themselves 
cannot be regarded as a social rule in Hart’s sense and nothing more.  They 
must formulate the rule to themselves in the form of an internal legal 
statement, and in performing lawmaking actions which invoke the rule they 
must do so⎯and must conceive of themselves as doing so⎯with the 
specific intention of imposing obligations on others (or changing their 
normative situation in some other way).  In fact, from this point of view, it 
is not clear what has been gained by reformulating the power-conferring 
rule as a rule which conditionally imposes duties.  Under either formulation, 
legislators must presumably think of themselves as engaging in acts which 
are undertaken with the intention of changing someone’s normative 
situation, and not simply as engaging in acts which have the effect of 
triggering the antecedent clause of a conditional rule.  But to engage in an 
act with the intention of changing someone’s normative situation is simply 
to engage in an act with the intention of exercising a normative power.  The 
supposed reduction of a power-conferring rule to a duty-imposing rule thus 
cannot, it would seem, completely eliminate the concept of a power. 
The difficulty with Hart’s proposed reduction of power-conferring rules 
to duty-imposing rules that was just considered has its source in his non-
cognitivist semantic theory for internal legal statements.  There is also 
another potential difficulty, however, which arises independently of Hart’s 
non-cognitivism.  Hart’s proposed reduction of a power-conferring rule to a 
conditional duty-imposing rule is very similar to a suggestion made by Raz 
to the effect that a special kind of obligation-imposing norm, which Raz 
calls an “obedience norm,” might also be regarded as power-conferring.  
Such norms, Raz suggests, “requir[e] that their norm subjects obey the 
power-holder if and when he exercises his power.”75  Raz goes on to point 
out, however, that if the power in question is a power to change the 
subjects’ normative situation in ways other than imposing obligations on 
 
 74. It will be recalled that in Part II I concluded that rules of change are best understood 
as customary rules that hold among legislators.  In the displayed passage from Essays on 
Bentham, Hart describes a simple rule of change that takes the form of a conditional duty-
imposing customary rule, in which the custom holds for the society at large.  But in a more 
sophisticated society, in which not everyone adopts the internal point of view, the custom 
will have to be limited to officials; for the reasons that I discussed in Part II, the relevant 
officials for these purposes are not judges, but rather legislators. 
 75. Raz, supra note 10, at 105.  A similar suggestion has also been made by 
MacCormick. See MacCormick, supra note 35, at 76-77. 
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them, then the norm conferring the power cannot be understood as an 
obedience norm: 
But if we have an option with regard to the logical form of norms 
conferring power to issue mandatory norms, we have no such option 
where the power includes power to issue permissive norms or power-
conferring norms.  In these cases the [power-conferring] norm can only be 
represented as having the [following] form . . . :  the norm subject has 
power, by performing the norm act when the conditions of application 
apply, to effect a certain normative change.76 
The power to make law which is claimed by the officials of a legal system 
is, however, clearly a general power to change the normative situation of 
the law’s subjects in almost any conceivable way.  The law not only claims 
the power to impose obligations on its subjects, but it also claims the power 
to confer powers on them, give them rights, grant them permissions, and so 
on.  If Raz’s observation in this passage is correct, then there would appear 
to be no way to generalize Hart’s proposed reductive analysis of rules 
conferring powers to obligate which would make the analysis applicable to 
power-imposing rules of whatever kind.77   
Perhaps solutions to these difficulties can be found, and the fundamental 
power-conferring rules of a legal system can be reduced to duty-imposing 
Hartian social rules.  But it is important to realize that the main impetus for 
treating this reductivist project as theoretically worthwhile would be that 
one accepted Hart’s semantic non-cognitivism.  This is because the type of 
norm and the type of normative statement that are most amenable to a non-
cognitivist analysis are, respectively, duty-imposing norms and statements 
 
 76. Raz, supra note 10, at 105-06. 
 77. Raz defends the very plausible view that a person has a power to effect a normative 
change if there is sufficient reason for regarding an intentional action on his or her part as 
effecting such a change, and if the justification for so regarding the action is that it is 
desirable to enable persons to make such normative changes by means of such acts. See, e.g., 
Raz, supra note 35, at 18.  Raz has suggested to me in a private communication that it is 
plausible to think that any normative change is a conditional or unconditional change in the 
circumstances under which there is a duty, so that one could, for example, explain a power to 
confer a power in the following way:  “If by doing B, Y is using a power to create a duty on 
X to do A because there is a rule to the effect that if Y does B, then X has a duty to do A, 
then Z has the power to give Y the power to impose a duty on X if there is a rule which says 
that if Z does C, then if Y does B, then X has a duty to do A.”  It does not follow, however, 
from the fact that every normative change can be explained as a change in the circumstances 
under which there is a duty, that every power-conferring norm is logically equivalent to a 
duty-imposing norm.  It is this latter result that Raz denies in the cited passage from 
Practical Reason and Norms, and that Hart requires if the strategy of reducing all power-
conferring rules to duty-imposing rules is to be successful.  It is also worth pointing out in 
this regard that Raz has elsewhere very plausibly argued that the ascription of rights has a 
dynamic character, in the sense that a right is not necessarily merely the ground of an 
existing duty, but may with changing circumstances generate new duties in the future. See 
Joseph Raz, The Morality of Freedom 185-86 (1986) [hereinafter Raz, The Morality of 
Freedom].  If that is correct, however, then the legal creation of a right may not be strictly 
explicable as, and therefore reducible to, a change in the circumstances under which persons 
have duties.  We could not, for example, replace a description of a normative situation which 
makes reference to rights with a description that makes reference only to existing duties. 
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that someone has a duty or obligation.  Furthermore, to the extent that 
technical solutions to the difficulties can be found, analogues of those 
solutions may be available to a defender of the Kelsenian view that all laws 
are, at bottom, directives imposing obligations on officials to apply 
sanctions.  Hart’s response to the Kelsenian thesis that power-conferring 
rules are best understood as “fragments” of such directives appears, after 
all, principally to rely on the general claim that power-conferring rules are 
simply distinct in their normative character from duty-imposing rules.78  In 
Essays on Bentham, in the course of a discussion of Bentham’s proposed 
reduction of all legal powers to conditional commands, Hart rejects 
Bentham’s specific proposal, but nonetheless explicitly considers the 
possibility that all power-conferring laws might be reduced to duty-
imposing rules.  Although he leaves open the technical question, Hart 
nonetheless forcefully reiterates his view that power-conferring laws “guide 
those exercising such powers in ways strikingly different from the way in 
which rules imposing duties guide behavior,” adding that “power-
conferring rules are distinct in their normative function from duty-imposing 
rules” and that “[t]o represent them as fragments of duty-imposing rules is 
to obscure their distinct normative character.”79 
Even if technical solutions turn out to be available to the Frege-Geach 
problem and to the difficulties that face any proposed reduction of power-
conferring rules to duty-imposing rules, we surely do much better if we take 
the law’s normative claims at face value and adopt a cognitivist theory of 
the meaning of legal statements.  Not only will we then be in a much better 
position to appreciate Hart’s insight that the introduction into society of 
rules conferring legislative and adjudicative powers “is a step forward as 
important . . . as the invention of the wheel,”80 but we will also be in a 
position to develop a much richer variety of jurisprudential theories.  If we 
take seriously the law’s claim to have the systematic capacity to change our 
normative situation, then we can ask such questions as whether or not the 
law ever does possess such a capacity, and what the justification for its 
possessing such a capacity might be.  Although Hart’s critique of the 
sanction- and prediction-based theories of his positivist predecessors was an 
essential move for the advancement of jurisprudence, his own theory of law 
is severely limited, in ways that have not always been appreciated by his 
successors, by its commitment to a non-cognitivist understanding of 
normativity. 
IV.  THE CONCEPT OF AUTHORITY AND THE INTERNAL POINT OF VIEW 
One of the most fundamental attributes of both the concept and the 
practice of law, and an essential feature of law’s nature, is that through its 
officials and its characteristic institutions law claims legitimate authority for 
 
 78. Hart, supra note 1, at 41. 
 79. Hart, supra note 58, at 219. 
 80. Hart, supra note 1, at 42. 
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itself, meaning that it claims for itself a legitimate power to change the 
normative situation of its subjects.  For purposes of simplicity, let me refer 
to the entity making this claim of authority as a lawmaker.  The most 
important way in which a lawmaker might change the normative situation 
of its subjects is to impose obligations on them, but this is not, of course, 
the only way.  The lawmaker, if it does indeed possess legitimate authority, 
might also change the normative situation of its subjects by conferring 
rights, powers, or permissions on them, by subjecting them to liabilities, by 
granting them immunities, and so on.  A lawmaker claiming legitimate 
authority would in fact possess such authority only if every purported 
exercise of its authority did, in fact, change the normative situation of its 
subjects in just the way that it purported to do.  Thus, for example, if it had 
attempted to impose a duty, it would have succeeded in imposing a duty, if 
it had attempted to create a right, it would have succeeded in creating a 
right, and so on.  It is sometimes said that legitimate authority is necessarily 
correlated with an obligation on the part of the lawmaker’s subjects to obey 
its directives,81 but this is not quite accurate.  The true normative correlate 
of a power is a liability to have one’s normative situation changed.  The 
properly generalized version of the idea of a general obligation to obey is 
thus something like a statement to the effect that the law has the general 
normative force that it purports to have.82 
The internal point of view, properly understood, is the perspective of 
both those who make and those who accept the legitimacy of the law’s 
claim to authority.  Once we discard Hart’s implausible semantic analysis 
of normative statements, then we are free to acknowledge that those who 
accept the legitimacy of law have not simply adopted a certain normative 
attitude, but rather hold a certain belief, which could be either true or false, 
about the legitimacy of law.  Furthermore, once we move away from Hart’s 
own semantic analysis, then we are no longer under theoretical pressure to 
demonstrate that the most fundamental elements of a legal system must be 
duty-imposing norms.  One result of Hart’s claim that every legal system 
rests on a duty-imposing rule of recognition is that many of his positivist 
successors have been almost obsessively concerned with analyzing the true 
nature of the rule of recognition, and with showing how it can, in fact, give 
officials obligations if we understand it as, say, a Lewis-style convention 
which solves a coordination problem, or as an instance of Michael 
Bratman’s notion of shared cooperative activity.83  But interesting and 
important as these analyses are, they often simply sidestep the question of 
whether and how the practices of officials might, by means of acts intended 
to be deliberate exercises of a normative power, give rise to obligations (or 
to other changes in normative status) on the part of citizens generally. 
 
 81. Raz, The Morality of Freedom, supra note 77, at 23. 
 82. For further discussion, see Stephen Perry, Law and Obligation, 50 Am. J. Juris. 263, 
266-76 (2005). 
 83. See supra notes 5-7 and accompanying text. 
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The contemporary legal theorists who have been most concerned with 
analyzing law’s claim to authority, and with determining whether and to 
what extent that claim can be vindicated, are John Finnis and Joseph Raz.84  
An approach to jurisprudence which focuses on such questions represents, 
in a sense, a return to a natural law sensibility, since these were among the 
philosophical questions about law that were treated by that tradition as 
central.  Finnis’s work is, of course, very much within the natural law 
tradition, and, while Raz is often described as a positivist and has at times 
applied that label to himself, he is in certain respects as much an inheritor of 
the natural law tradition as he is of the positivist one.85  This is particularly 
true with respect to his views on the normativity of law, which I will 
discuss in a moment. 
To treat the idea that the law claims legitimate authority for itself as a 
fundamental attribute of law, and perhaps the most fundamental attribute, 
suggests a number of more specific avenues of jurisprudential inquiry.  
First, there is a fairly narrow conceptual inquiry which addresses the 
question of who must make the claim to authority, and who must accept it, 
in order to help justify such conclusions as that a legal system exists in such 
and such a place.86  Raz is engaging in such an inquiry when, for example, 
he defines a de facto authority as an entity that “either claims to be [a] 
legitimate [authority] or is believed to be so, and is effective in imposing its 
will on many over whom it claims authority, perhaps because its claim to 
legitimacy is recognized by many of its subjects.”87  Our ordinary concepts 
of law and of a legal system do not make it a necessary condition of the 
existence of a legal system that political regimes in fact possess legitimate 
authority, but they do require that such regimes at least be de facto 
authorities in Raz’s sense.  It is important to emphasize the point made 
earlier that both claiming to be a legitimate authority and accepting the 
legitimacy of an authority involve believing either that one possesses 
legitimate authority or that one is subject to such authority.88  Thus, to 
adopt the internal point of view in the sense I defined earlier is likewise to 
believe something; it is to believe that a de facto authority’s claim to be 
legitimate is justified.  This is very different from Hart’s understanding of 
the internal point of view as simply a certain kind of attitude. 
Notice that because, for Hart, the existence on a shared and widespread 
basis of the internal point of view in the attitudinal sense is one of the 
constitutive elements of the rule of recognition, Hart was forced to restrict 
the group whose practice is said to comprise the rule to persons who could, 
 
 84. See, e.g., Finnis, supra note 5, at 1-22, 231-59; Raz, supra note 35, at 1-33; Joseph 
Raz, Ethics in the Public Domain 194-221 (1994) [hereinafter Raz, Ethics in the Public 
Domain]; Raz, The Morality of Freedom, supra note 77, at 23-105. 
 85. See, e.g., Raz, supra note 35, at 143-45, 157-59. 
 86. For an interesting discussion of this question in the context of American law, see 
Matthew P. Adler, Popular Constitutionalism and the Rule of Recognition:  Whose Practices 
Ground U.S. Law?, 100 Nw. U. L. Rev. 719 (2006). 
 87. Raz, Ethics in the Public Domain, supra note 84, at 195. 
 88. See Raz, The Morality of Freedom, supra note 77, at 65. 
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in fact, be generally expected to have adopted the internal point of view.  
This is presumably why Hart says that, so far as the existence of the rule of 
recognition is concerned, it is sufficient that officials, and officials only, 
have for the most part accepted it in his sense.  If the relevant group were 
extended to citizens generally, then because many citizens may have 
adopted the external rather than the internal point of view, Hart would face 
the embarrassment of having to treat states that most people would 
unhesitatingly regard as having legal systems as not, in fact, having them; 
such states would not have a rule of recognition, and hence would not have 
law.89  On the other hand, again because the internal point of view in the 
attitudinal sense is partly constitutive of the rule of recognition, Hart must 
then make what some might well regard as the equally embarrassing 
admission that, so long as a given regime is efficacious in the sense that 
most people generally comply with its directives, it is still a legal system 
even if no one other than its officials adopts the internal point of view.90  
That Hart’s theory is caught between these two sources of potential 
embarrassment is the upshot of his view that the normativity of law can be 
explained by pointing to the existence of a certain shared attitude, and that 
such a shared attitude is a constitutive element of the foundational norm of 
a legal system.  The cognitivist understanding of the internal point of view, 
which treats it as a belief in the legitimacy of a de facto authority’s claim to 
legitimacy, does not face these embarrassments.  No doubt it is a truth about 
our concept of law that the agents of a political regime which claims 
legitimate authority for itself⎯in other words, its officials⎯must for the 
most part believe that the claim is justified if the regime can be said to have 
a legal system.  But it may well also be a truth about the concept that at 
least some of the subjects of the regime must also hold this belief.91  How 
many is a sufficient number?  There is no precise answer to this question.  
But because the internal point of view in the broader sense does not, or at 
least does not necessarily, conceptually tie the existence of a legal system to 
the existence of a fundamental norm which is partly constituted by a shared 
 
 89. Hart says that, in pre-legal, customary societies, “it is plain that [those who reject the 
rules] cannot be more than a minority.” Hart, supra note 1, at 92.  It is not entirely clear 
whether he regards this as an explicit elaboration of the existence conditions of a social rule, 
so that if only a minority adopted the internal point of view the rule could not be said to 
exist, or whether he is limiting himself to the sociological observation that a customary 
society in which only a minority held the internal point of view would not endure for very 
long.  Either way, it is clear that there must be some minimum number of persons who hold 
the internal point of view before a social rule can even be said to exist among a group, and 
one would expect this number to consist of at least a bare majority. 
 90. Id. at 117. 
 91. Raz, following Hans Kelsen, has made the very important point that it is possible to 
engage in the normative discourse of the law without actually accepting the law’s moral 
authority, since it is possible to engage in such discourse by adopting a hypothetical or 
detached perspective.  One can thus speak as though the law has moral authority while not 
actually accepting that it does, or while withholding belief on whether or not it does. See, 
e.g., Raz, supra note 35, at 137-43. 
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attitude of endorsement, this is nothing but a minor conceptual 
indeterminacy which has no larger theoretical implications.92 
A second avenue of jurisprudential inquiry that is opened up by taking 
the law’s claim to authority⎯and hence a cognitivist understanding of the 
internal point of view⎯as one’s theoretical starting point concerns the 
nature of law’s normativity.  Hart took the foundational arrangements of 
law to consist of at least one norm, in the sense of norm that I defined in 
Part I as a standard of conduct or purported standard of conduct which 
exists simply as a certain kind of social artifact.  Since Hart’s analysis of 
normativity was non-cognitivist in nature, he held the view, as we have 
seen, that all there was to be said about the normativity of law resides in the 
fact that those who adopt the internal point of view endorse its standards as 
obligatory; there is nothing more to be said about whether law, as law, 
gives rise to reasons for action.93  Of course there might be prudential 
reasons to follow the law, or, if a particular legal system can be assessed 
from the external point of view to have moral value, there might be moral 
reasons, but that is a different matter.94  If, however, one adopts a fully 
cognitivist understanding of internal legal statements such as “It is the law 
of Pennsylvania that X,” then one will understand them as asserting that a 
certain normative state of affairs obtains, rather than as expressing an 
endorsement of a certain kind.  This does not preclude the possibility of 
understanding the foundations of law as consisting of conventionalist norms 
of some kind, but one will presumably try to do so, as Hart did not, in a way 
 
 92. Other theories that take the foundational arrangements of law to consist of norms 
might well confront problems similar to those I have said face Hart’s theory.  But such 
problems should generally not arise for theories that view the normativity of law in moral 
terms. 
 93. Both Toh and Shapiro make this point, and observe that many legal theorists have 
criticized Hart either for assuming that social rules are inherently reason-giving, or for 
failing to give an account of how they could be reason-giving. Shapiro, supra note 2, at 
1166-67; Toh, supra note 61, at 77.  I have in the past been guilty of this sin myself. See 
Perry, Holmes Versus Hart, supra note 28; Perry, Interpretation and Methodology, supra 
note 28.  Once, however, one realizes that Hart was really a non-cognitivist, such criticisms 
are immediately seen to be beside the point. 
 94. Cf. Hart, supra note 1, at 107-08. 
  There are, indeed, many questions which we can raise about this ultimate rule 
[i.e., the rule of recognition]. . . .  We can ask whether it is a satisfactory form of 
legal system which has such a rule at its root.  Does it produce more good than 
evil?  Are there prudential reasons for supporting it?  Is there a moral obligation to 
do so?  These are plainly very important questions; but, equally plainly, when we 
ask them about the rule of recognition, we are no longer attempting to answer the 
same kind of question about it as those which we answered about other rules with 
its aid. . . .  [W]hen we move from the statement that a particular enactment is 
valid, to the [external] statement that the rule of recognition . . . is an excellent one 
and the system based on it is one worthy of support, we have moved from a 
statement of legal validity to a statement of value. 
Id. Given that Hart understands legal normativity in partially non-cognitivist terms, it is 
difficult to see why he would understand moral normativity any differently. See supra note 
69.  Be that as it may, Hart clearly thinks that morality provides a distinct source of 
evaluative judgments that can be brought to bear, as an external matter, upon law. 
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that shows these norms to be at least potentially reason-giving.95  This is, I 
take it, the project of Scott Shapiro and Jules Coleman in trying to extend 
Michael Bratman’s notion of shared cooperative activity to enterprises in 
which, like law, some persons make claims of authority over others.96 
If one takes the approach of grounding the foundations of law on 
Bratman-like norms or on cooperative conventions of some other kind, then 
one might well be led to treat the normativity of law as nonmoral in nature, 
and indeed Coleman in particular explicitly agrees with Hart that the 
meaning of normative expressions is different in moral and legal contexts.97  
The obvious analogy is with other cooperative enterprises which contain 
structures of authority, for example the National Hockey League, which 
promulgates and occasionally modifies the rules for the conduct of the 
professional sport of hockey.  There is clearly a species of normativity 
involved here, but equally clearly it is not moral normativity.  But this is 
not, of course, the only kind of authoritative association among persons to 
which law can be analogized.  Consider, for example, the authority which 
parents have, or which they at least claim or are said to have, over their 
children.  Given that this association is, at least from the child’s perspective, 
nonconsensual, and given that the exercise of parental authority can affect 
the life of a child in very significant ways, it is difficult to conceive of such 
authority, if it exists, as anything other than moral in nature.  Although so 
far as I am aware he does not offer the analogy of the family, Joseph Raz 
has pointed to the similarly nonconsensual nature of the law, and to the 
significant ways in which the law affects people’s lives, to argue, to my 
mind completely persuasively, that the normativity of law is moral 
normativity, and that the law’s claim of legitimate authority is a moral 
claim.98 
Notice that, if one conceives of the law’s claim to authority as a moral 
claim, then one is not committed, or at least one is not committed by that 
fact alone, to conceiving of the foundations of law as essentially consisting 
of norms, in the sense of a norm as a convention or some other kind of 
 
 95. I am here using the term “conventionalist” in a deliberately broad fashion. See supra 
note 5.  In the Postcript to the second edition of The Concept of Law, Hart modifies his view 
of social rules in general, and of the rule of recognition in particular, so as to apply only to 
“conventional social practices.”  Social practices are defined as conventional “if the general 
conformity of a group to them is part of the reasons which its individual members have for 
acceptance.” Hart, supra note 1, at 255.  However, since Hart does not appear to be at all 
concerned with the ways in which the conventionality of a rule might further affect the 
reasons for action of those who accept the rule, this change in his view appears to be 
completely unmotivated. 
 96. Coleman, supra note 5, at 74-102; Shapiro, supra note 2. 
 97. Coleman states that “[l]aw necessarily claims a normative power to create genuine 
rights and obligations,” but denies that the rights and obligations which are the subject of this 
claim must be moral rights and obligations. Coleman, supra note 5, at 143-44.  On Hart’s 
view of the relationship between legal and moral normativity, see supra note 69. 
 98. For a recent statement of Raz’s view, see Raz, supra note 9, at 6.  For a more 
detailed defense, see J. Raz, Hart on Moral Rights and Legal Duties, 4 O.J.L.S. 123, 129-31 
(1984). 
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social artifact.  It would seem odd, for example, to think of parental 
authority as grounded in such a norm.  Modern legal systems are of course 
exceptionally complex normative structures, and their constitutional 
arrangements are no doubt largely comprised of norms in much the same 
way as I suggested earlier is true of their regular law.  But the basic claim of 
moral authority must rest on a moral principle, not a norm, or at the very 
least it must assume that such a moral principle exists.99  Moreover, the 
basic claim of moral authority can be made even in the case of a very 
simple constitutional arrangement which, much as in the case of the family, 
it would be implausible to think consisted of norms.  This would seem to be 
true, for example, of Rex, the absolute monarch.  If Rex claims moral 
authority over his subjects, and if he legislates for them on the basis of that 
claimed authority, then, on the view of law I am considering, there is no 
reason to think that we do not have a simple example of a legal system.  
The laws which Rex promulgates are norms because they have social 
existence conditions relating to actions taken by Rex.  And while Rex’s 
moral power to make law might be conditioned on certain facts obtaining, 
for example, that his subjects generally comply with his laws, there is, in 
the absence of further argument, no reason why we need to think of this 
power, supposing Rex’s claim to authority were in fact a justified one, as 
anything other than a pure moral power whose existence neither consists in 
nor derives from a norm. 
A third avenue of inquiry concerns the substantive issues that arise when 
we consider whether the law’s claim to authority can ever in fact be 
justified.  If one conceives of the normativity of law as moral normativity, 
then discussion will turn to first-order questions in moral and political 
philosophy.  If one thinks instead that legal normativity is nonmoral in 
nature, then discussion might turn to other branches of practical philosophy, 
or perhaps to issues in the theory of rationality.  For those theorists who 
conceive of legal normativity in moral terms and who believe that law’s 
claim to legitimate authority is at least sometimes or to some extent capable 
of being vindicated, the task becomes one of adducing a moral principle 
which shows how this could be true.  The traditional natural law view, a 
powerful contemporary version of which has been defended by John Finnis, 
makes the moral claim that, as Finnis puts it, “the sheer fact that virtually 
everyone will acquiesce in somebody’s say-so is the presumptively 
necessary and defeasibly sufficient condition for the normative judgment 
that that person has (i.e., is justified in exercising) authority in that 
community.”100  Joseph Raz defends the view that the moral authority of 
law, where it exists, rests on the fact that the subjects of the law will better 
 
 99. The distinction I am drawing here between the possibility that law might be 
grounded in a moral principle and the possibility that it might be grounded in a constitutive 
norm is similar but not identical to the distinction Dworkin once drew between the 
possibility that law might be grounded in “concurrent morality” and the possibility that it 
might be grounded in “conventional morality.” Dworkin, supra note 11, at 53. 
 100. Finnis, supra note 5, at 250. 
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comply with the reasons for action that apply to them if they obey the law 
than if they act on their own judgment.101  Ronald Dworkin, although he 
does not explicitly speak of law as claiming legitimate authority, 
nonetheless makes it a central tenet of his theory of law that the state 
possesses moral legitimacy, and its citizens have a corresponding general 
moral obligation to obey the law, if its legal and political system considered 
as a whole possesses a special moral virtue, which Dworkin calls 
integrity.102 
The distinction between positivist and anti-positivist theories of law can 
be drawn in a number of different ways, and, depending on how one draws 
it, a given theory or theorist can sometimes be classified one way and 
sometimes the other.  Probably the most important way of drawing a 
postivist/anti-positivist distinction concerns whether there is a necessary 
relationship of any kind between morality and the normative content of law, 
but I have not touched on that set of questions in this essay.103  Another 
common way of drawing such a distinction, however, looks to whether the 
normativity of law is conceived in moral or nonmoral terms.  From that 
perspective, Hart and Coleman are both positivists, whereas both Dworkin 
and Raz fall on the anti-positivist side of the line.  Finnis’s view on this 
issue is rather complicated, since he believes that the law’s “schema of 
practical reasoning” can be read in either a “restricted, legal sense” or in an 
“unrestricted, moral sense.”104  Yet a third way of drawing a positivist/anti-
positivist distinction looks to whether or not the theorist thinks that there 
are conditions which are sufficiently easily satisfied so as to give rise to a 
general moral obligation to obey the law in legal systems that either exist or 
that one could easily imagine as existing.105  From this perspective, both 
 
 101. Raz, Ethics in the Public Domain, supra note 84, at 194-204.  I discuss both Raz’s 
and Finnis’s views on the authority of law in Perry, supra note 82. 
 102. Ronald Dworkin, Law’s Empire 176-224 (1986).  I have elsewhere suggested that 
Dworkin’s argument tying the legitimacy of law to integrity should be understood as based 
on the claim that when a legal system possesses the virtue of integrity, the relationship 
between the political community and its individual members is thereby rendered intrinsically 
valuable. See Stephen Perry, Associative Obligations and the Obligation to Obey the Law, in 
Exploring Law’s Empire:  The Jurisprudence of Ronald Dworkin 183, 198-205 (Scott 
Hershovitz ed., 2006). 
 103. Elsewhere I have discussed the proper framing of these questions, and offered a 
preliminary discussion of how one might go about showing that there is a necessary 
connection between morality and the normative content of law. See Perry, supra note 102, at 
183-89. 
 104. Finnis, supra note 5, at 319.  Because of this aspect of his views, Finnis does not, in 
fact, think that law claims moral authority, but only that it claims legal authority. See Perry, 
supra note 82, at 289 n.46. 
 105. As I noted earlier, the properly generalized version of a general obligation to obey is 
something like the idea that the law has general normative force.  For a theorist who thinks 
that the law claims moral legitimacy, the conclusion that there is a general obligation to 
obey⎯more generally, that the law has general moral force⎯is just a correlate of the 
conclusion that the law’s claim to moral authority is, in fact, a justified one.  But even a 
theorist who thinks that the normativity of law is nonmoral in nature might conceivably also 
think that the law possesses, either necessarily or under certain fairly easily satisfiable 
conditions, a moral property which gives rise to a general moral obligation to obey the law. 
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Dworkin and Finnis are anti-positivists, whereas Hart, Raz, and Coleman 
are positivists.  Although Raz thinks that it is, in principle, conceivable that 
every single subject of the law might on every single occasion to which the 
law applies do better in complying with right reason by obeying the law 
than by acting on his own judgment, this is so unlikely in practice that we 
can safely conclude that no legal system ever has the complete authority it 
claims for itself, and hence that it is never the case that there exists a 
general obligation to obey the law.106 
A fourth and final avenue of inquiry concerns various further conceptual 
and methodological issues that arise when one takes the idea that law 
claims legitimate authority for itself as one’s jurisprudential starting point.  
Raz has argued, for example, that since the law claims to have authority, it 
must be capable of having it.  The law and legal institutions are central to 
our particular concept of authority, and while officials can sometimes be 
conceptually confused, they could not, according to Raz, be so confused 
that the claim to authority was not, at least in principle, capable of being 
met.107  Raz’s argument that the law must be capable of having the 
authority that it claims for itself may or may not be correct, but surely if the 
law was not, in principle, capable of possessing such authority, something 
would have gone seriously amiss with our concepts of law and authority 
alike.  Furthermore, if it is in the nature of law that legal systems are 
capable, at least in principle, of systematically obligating their subjects, 
then that is a moral property which law necessarily possesses.  Finally, the 
argument required to establish that the law does or does not necessarily 
possess a moral property of the kind just described cannot help but be moral 
in character, and to that limited extent, at least, the methodology of 
jurisprudence requires that we engage in substantive first-order moral 
argument.108 
Consider, by way of analogy, the case of promises.  Just as lawmakers 
engage in actions which are intended to place other persons under 
obligations, so too do promisors engage in actions which are intended to 
place themselves under obligations.  One important set of philosophical 
questions about both the concept and the practice of promising asks whether 
or not promises ever are, in fact, morally binding, and, if they are, what 
principle or set of principles accounts for this fact.  Once we know what 
these principles are, we can then ask further questions about their scope:  
Perhaps only promises made under certain conditions, or promises whose 
content is constrained in certain ways, can be binding in nature.  Whatever 
the answer to these various questions about promising might be, the 
important point to note for present purposes is that we can only go about 
 
 106. Raz, Ethics in the Public Domain, supra note 84, at 325-38. 
 107. Id. at 201. 
 108. Raz denies that this is true of his own “service” conception of authority.  See id. at 
219.  I believe that he is wrong on this point, although I cannot discuss the matter here.  I 
have criticized certain aspects of the service conception in Perry, supra note 82, at 276-84, 
290-91. 
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answering them by engaging in first-order moral argument, and the same 
point holds when we ask analogous questions about the concept and 
practice of law. 
It should, however, be noted, as a final cautionary observation, that 
different jurisprudential questions may have to be answered by resort to 
different methodological approaches.  The fact that certain questions about 
the nature of law can only be answered by engaging in substantive moral 
argument does not entail that there are not other, perhaps equally important, 
jurisprudential questions which can only be answered in an essentially 
descriptive manner.  Methodological issues in jurisprudence are much more 
complex and varied than is often assumed by commentators to be the case, 
and there may thus be no simple or univocal answer to the question of 
whether jurisprudence requires a methodology that can comprehensively be 
characterized as “descriptive” on the one hand, or as necessarily and 
comprehensively implicating a broad range of substantive moral questions 
on the other hand.  These are obviously very difficult issues, and I can do 
no more than draw attention to them here.  Their further exploration must 
await another occasion. 
